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Executive	  Summary	  	  How	  can	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies	  best	  plan	  to	  fight	  conventional	  conflicts	  against	  nuclear-­‐armed	  adversaries	  without	  triggering	  adversary	  nuclear	  escalation?	  	  Preventing	  nuclear	  escalation	  during	  conventional	  war	  is	  arguably	  the	  greatest	  national	  security	  challenge	  facing	  U.S.	  leaders	  in	  the	  21st	  century.	  	  This	  report	  describes	  the	  problem	  of	  adversary	  coercive	  nuclear	  escalation,	  and	  offers	  recommendations	  for	  how	  U.S.	  and	  allied	  political	  leaders	  and	  military	  planners	  might	  better	  evaluate	  –	  and	  prepare	  to	  deal	  with	  –	  the	  difficult	  inherent	  tradeoffs	  between	  the	  need	  for	  military	  effectiveness,	  the	  risks	  of	  adversary	  escalation,	  and	  desired	  end	  states.	  	  The	  paradox	  of	  U.S.	  power	  today	  is	  that	  America’s	  conventional	  military	  supremacy	  not	  only	  provides	  tremendous	  security	  to	  the	  nation	  and	  its	  allies	  and	  partners,	  but	  also	  means	  that	  U.S.	  adversaries	  feel	  compelled	  to	  respond	  asymmetrically	  –	  by	  relying	  on	  nuclear	  weapons	  –	  to	  survive	  a	  conventional	  war.	  	  Recent	  and	  future	  conflicts	  involving	  the	  United	  States	  and	  relatively	  weaker	  adversaries	  are	  often	  referred	  to	  in	  Washington	  as	  “regional”	  or	  “limited”	  wars,	  but	  for	  U.S.	  adversaries	  there	  is	  nothing	  limited	  about	  them:	  the	  dire	  consequences	  of	  likely	  military	  defeat	  mean	  that	  these	  conflicts	  are	  existential	  struggles.	  	  Thus,	  adversary	  leaders	  face	  powerful	  and	  rational	  incentives	  to	  coerce	  an	  end	  to	  combat	  very	  quickly	  –	  before	  suffering	  too	  many	  major	  battlefield	  defeats.	  	  Nuclear	  escalation	  to	  achieve	  stalemate	  in	  this	  context	  might	  well	  be	  a	  reasonable	  gamble.	  	  Indeed,	  a	  strategy	  of	  coercive	  nuclear	  escalation	  may	  be	  the	  only	  option	  that	  holds	  any	  promise	  of	  adversary	  survival.	  	  The	  basic	  rationale	  behind	  a	  strategy	  of	  coercive	  nuclear	  escalation	  rests	  on	  adversary	  perceptions	  of	  the	  looming	  costs	  of	  defeat	  in	  a	  conventional	  war,	  which	  are	  dire;	  the	  likely	  benefits	  of	  escalation,	  which	  stem	  from	  the	  grim	  set	  of	  response	  options	  such	  a	  strategy	  would	  pose	  for	  U.S.	  and	  allied	  leaders;	  and	  the	  need	  to	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gamble	  for	  resurrection,	  whereby	  adversary	  leaders	  have	  little	  to	  lose	  and	  much	  to	  gain	  by	  escalating	  the	  conflict.	  	  The	  core	  logic	  of	  escalation	  is	  supported	  by	  historical	  and	  contemporary	  evidence	  of	  countries	  being	  willing	  to	  resort	  to	  an	  escalatory	  strategy:	  compelling	  examples	  include	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  Cold	  War,	  as	  well	  as	  North	  Korea,	  Pakistan,	  and	  Russia	  today.	  	  Several	  features	  of	  the	  contemporary	  strategic	  context	  exacerbate	  the	  fundamental	  escalation	  problem.	  	  The	  nature	  of	  modern	  warfare,	  in	  which	  military	  effectiveness	  is	  derived	  in	  large	  measure	  from	  the	  ability	  to	  degrade	  enemy	  command	  and	  control	  systems	  and	  other	  vital	  leadership	  nodes,	  is	  also	  inherently	  escalatory.	  	  Attacks	  on	  adversary	  strategic	  assets	  (nuclear	  weapons	  and	  delivery	  systems)	  are	  even	  more	  so.	  	  Another	  exacerbating	  factor	  includes	  differing	  perspectives	  between	  U.S.	  and	  allied	  leaders	  about	  the	  nature	  and	  severity	  of	  escalation	  risks	  in	  a	  given	  theater,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  tradeoffs	  between	  conventional	  military	  effectiveness	  and	  escalation	  control	  in	  that	  context.	  	  Finally,	  preventing	  escalation	  is	  an	  even	  greater	  challenge	  than	  it	  might	  be	  in	  isolation	  because	  of	  the	  inherent	  difficult	  of	  calibrating	  and	  controlling	  military	  operations	  to	  achieve	  political	  objectives	  in	  wartime.	  	  The	  current	  danger	  of	  adversary	  nuclear	  escalation	  during	  conventional	  wars	  cannot	  be	  eliminated,	  but	  the	  U.S.	  government	  can	  take	  some	  reasonable	  steps	  to	  reduce	  the	  risks	  and	  mitigate	  the	  consequences.	  	  This	  report	  outlines	  six	  such	  recommendations	  for	  military	  planners	  and	  civilian	  leaders:	  (1)	  provide	  leaders	  with	  a	  range	  of	  potential	  end	  states;	  (2)	  ensure	  greater	  coherence	  between	  military	  operations	  and	  mission	  objectives;	  (3)	  prepare	  appropriate	  communications	  strategies	  for	  adversaries,	  allies,	  and	  key	  third	  parties;	  (4)	  require	  an	  explicit	  “escalation	  avoidance	  strategy”	  as	  an	  element	  of	  war	  plans;	  (5)	  conduct	  tabletop	  exercises	  in	  order	  to	  refine	  escalation	  concepts	  and	  enhance	  alliance	  cohesion;	  and	  (6)	  develop	  key	  capabilities	  for	  mitigating	  the	  consequences	  of	  escalation.	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I.	  	  Introduction	  	  	  The	  paramount	  U.S.	  national	  security	  challenge	  of	  the	  21st	  century	  is	  preventing	  adversary	  use	  of	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction.	  	  The	  greatest	  danger	  of	  such	  deterrence	  failure	  is	  likely	  to	  emerge	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  conventional	  wars	  involving	  U.S.	  and	  allied	  forces	  fighting	  against	  nuclear-­‐armed	  foes.	  	  In	  those	  conflicts,	  U.S.	  adversaries	  will	  face	  tremendous	  incentives	  to	  use	  nuclear	  weapons	  to	  compel	  a	  military	  stalemate	  before	  they	  suffer	  battlefield	  defeat	  and	  the	  attendant	  consequences	  for	  regime	  survival.	  	  This	  report	  aims	  to	  improve	  our	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  United	  States	  might	  best	  plan	  to	  fight	  conventional	  regional	  wars	  without	  triggering	  adversary	  nuclear	  escalation.	  	  The	  analytical	  framework	  introduced	  here	  aims	  to	  be	  useful	  in	  three	  major	  ways:	  	  First,	  it	  should	  help	  U.S.	  military	  planners	  identify	  likely	  escalation	  triggers	  during	  conventional	  wars.	  	  Second,	  it	  should	  help	  U.S.	  commands	  develop	  war	  plans	  to	  achieve	  U.S.	  military	  objectives	  while	  minimizing	  the	  risk	  of	  adversary	  escalation.	  Third,	  the	  analysis	  should	  prompt	  security	  studies	  analysts	  to	  explore	  more	  rigorously	  the	  nuclear	  escalation	  risks	  facing	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  coming	  decades,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  means	  of	  prevention.	  	  In	  short,	  this	  report	  develops	  a	  framework	  that	  U.S.	  planners,	  political	  leaders,	  and	  security	  studies	  analysts	  can	  use	  to	  understand	  how	  U.S.	  military	  objectives	  in	  a	  given	  theater	  of	  conventional	  conflict	  can	  be	  pursued	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  overarching	  U.S.	  strategic	  objective	  of	  minimizing	  the	  risk	  of	  nuclear	  escalation.	  	  This	  report	  is	  organized	  as	  follows:	  The	  first	  major	  section	  analyzes	  the	  core	  problem	  of	  adversary	  coercive	  nuclear	  escalation.	  	  We	  examine	  the	  basic	  logic	  of	  escalation;	  review	  evidence	  indicating	  its	  real-­‐world	  relevance;	  and	  discuss	  several	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major	  factors	  of	  contemporary	  warfare	  that	  exacerbate	  the	  problem.	  	  The	  second	  major	  section	  explores	  options	  for	  mitigating	  adversary	  escalation	  risks.	  	  We	  examine	  the	  need	  for:	  tradeoffs	  among	  desired	  end	  states,	  military	  effectiveness,	  and	  escalation	  avoidance;	  coherence	  between	  military	  operations	  and	  mission	  objectives	  in	  light	  of	  escalation	  dangers;	  communication	  strategies	  for	  adversaries,	  allies,	  and	  third	  parties;	  war	  plans	  that	  include	  explicit	  escalation	  avoidance	  strategies;	  realistic	  tabletop	  exercises;	  and	  military	  capabilities	  that	  can	  best	  mitigate	  the	  consequences	  of	  escalation	  if	  prevention	  fails.	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II.	  	  The	  Problem	  of	  Coercive	  Nuclear	  Escalation	  	  The	  international	  strategic	  environment	  –	  and	  the	  role	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  in	  U.S.	  national	  security	  policy	  –	  has	  changed	  dramatically	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  For	  nearly	  four	  decades	  starting	  in	  the	  late	  1940s,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  NATO	  allies	  planned	  to	  use	  nuclear	  weapons	  to	  defend	  themselves	  from	  a	  major	  Soviet	  and	  Warsaw	  Pact	  invasion	  of	  Western	  Europe.	  	  The	  armies	  of	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact	  were	  considered	  to	  be	  too	  formidable	  to	  confront	  with	  a	  strictly	  conventional	  defense,	  at	  least	  at	  spending	  levels	  acceptable	  to	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  alliance.	  	  Nuclear	  weapons	  were	  thus	  NATO’s	  “trump	  card.”	  	  NATO	  planned	  to	  employ	  nuclear	  weapons	  coercively	  during	  a	  war	  to	  raise	  the	  costs	  and	  risks	  to	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact,	  and	  thereby	  convince	  it	  to	  halt	  military	  operations	  before	  it	  could	  defeat	  NATO.	  	  The	  Cold	  War	  is	  over,	  but	  the	  underlying	  conditions	  that	  made	  nuclear	  weapons	  vital	  then	  still	  exist	  today.	  	  What	  has	  changed:	  the	  seats	  at	  the	  table.	  	  Just	  as	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  allies	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  relied	  on	  nuclear	  weapons	  to	  deter	  an	  adversary	  that	  possessed	  overwhelming	  conventional	  military	  power,	  several	  key	  states	  today	  (including	  potential	  U.S.	  adversaries)	  face	  the	  same	  critical	  task.	  	  They	  are	  thus	  likely	  to	  choose	  the	  same	  strategy.	  	  The	  platitude	  that	  nuclear	  weapons	  are	  not	  well	  suited	  to	  the	  security	  threats	  of	  this	  century	  is	  incorrect;	  for	  those	  countries	  that	  fear	  U.S.	  military	  might	  nuclear	  weapons	  are	  as	  good	  of	  a	  deterrent	  as	  they	  were	  for	  NATO	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  Today,	  the	  United	  States	  possesses	  conventional	  military	  superiority,	  and	  potential	  U.S.	  adversaries	  around	  the	  world	  need	  trump	  cards	  of	  their	  own	  to	  stalemate	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Recent	  conflicts	  involving	  the	  United	  States	  are	  often	  referred	  to	  in	  Washington	  as	  “regional”	  or	  “limited”	  wars.	  	  But	  for	  U.S.	  adversaries,	  there	  is	  nothing	  regional	  or	  limited	  about	  them:	  the	  dire	  consequences	  of	  military	  defeat	  mean	  that	  these	  conflicts	  are	  existential	  struggles	  for	  the	  weak.	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Adversary	  leaders,	  therefore,	  face	  powerful	  and	  rational	  incentives	  to	  create	  a	  stalemate	  and	  coerce	  an	  end	  to	  combat	  very	  quickly	  –	  before	  suffering	  too	  many	  major	  battlefield	  defeats.	  	  Nuclear	  escalation	  in	  this	  context	  would	  be	  a	  reasonable	  gamble.1	  	  Indeed,	  it	  may	  be	  the	  only	  strategy	  that	  holds	  any	  promise	  of	  survival.	  	  	  A	  skeptic	  of	  this	  view	  might	  wonder	  if	  this	  threat	  is	  overinflated.	  	  Perhaps	  nuclear	  escalation	  only	  makes	  sense	  as	  a	  logical	  abstraction;	  indeed,	  one	  entirely	  dependent	  on	  conjuring	  up	  a	  dire	  life-­‐or-­‐death	  scenario	  for	  adversary	  leaders.	  	  Such	  skepticism	  is	  mistaken,	  however.	  	  Recent	  history	  and	  the	  current	  strategic	  environment	  make	  this	  far	  from	  a	  hypothetical	  danger.	  	  	  	  The	  United	  States	  has	  easily	  vanquished	  half	  a	  dozen	  military	  opponents	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.2	  	  Today,	  the	  United	  States	  maintains	  a	  vast	  network	  of	  alliances	  and	  strategic	  partnerships	  –	  and	  the	  most	  likely	  potential	  adversary	  of	  most	  of	  those	  allies	  and	  partners	  is	  a	  nuclear-­‐armed	  one.	  	  This	  means	  that	  U.S.	  security	  commitments	  could	  quickly	  entail	  conventional	  combat	  against	  a	  nuclear-­‐armed	  (yet	  weaker)	  adversary.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  not	  hard	  to	  imagine	  several	  highly	  plausible	  real-­‐world	  contingencies:	  	  In	  the	  coming	  years,	  the	  U.S.	  military	  might	  be	  required	  to	  fight	  a	  major	  conventional	  war	  against	  a	  nuclear-­‐armed	  adversary	  on	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula;	  it	  could	  be	  drawn	  into	  an	  air	  and	  naval	  combat	  with	  China;	  and	  it	  might	  eventually	  face	  a	  nuclear-­‐armed	  Iran	  in	  an	  air-­‐,	  sea-­‐	  and	  ground-­‐campaign	  to	  keep	  open	  the	  Strait	  of	  Hormuz.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Throughout	  this	  report,	  the	  term	  “adversary	  escalation”	  refers	  to	  adversary	  threats	  of	  imminent	  nuclear	  weapons	  use	  or	  the	  actual	  employment	  of	  nuclear	  weapons.	  	  Such	  threats	  could	  be	  implicit	  (for	  example,	  raising	  the	  alert	  status	  of	  nuclear	  forces)	  or	  explicit.	  	  The	  employment	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  could	  range	  from	  a	  non-­‐lethal	  demonstration	  (such	  as	  carrying	  out	  a	  nuclear	  test	  or	  a	  detonation	  above	  international	  waters)	  to	  an	  actual	  nuclear	  strike.	  2	  Since	  1989,	  U.S.	  military	  forces,	  supported	  in	  some	  cases	  by	  a	  coalition	  of	  allies,	  defeated	  the	  military	  forces	  of	  the	  following	  states	  with	  minimal	  U.S.	  losses:	  Panama	  (1989),	  Iraq	  (1991),	  Serbia	  (1999),	  Afghanistan	  (2001),	  and	  Iraq	  again	  (2003),	  and	  the	  U.S.	  provided	  support	  to	  the	  operation	  that	  overthrew	  the	  Libyan	  government	  (2011).	  	  Although	  the	  U.S.	  military	  has	  had	  considerable	  difficulty	  defeating	  insurgents,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  weak	  governments,	  the	  hope	  that	  after	  one’s	  defeat	  and	  arrest	  (or	  execution)	  rebels	  will	  frustrate	  the	  enemy	  is	  cold	  comfort.	  	  	  
	   9	  
In	  short,	  adversary	  coercive	  nuclear	  escalation	  is	  a	  real	  and	  significant	  problem.	  	  Resorting	  to	  such	  a	  strategy	  would	  be	  cold-­‐blooded,	  but	  not	  irrational	  or	  far-­‐fetched.	  	  The	  remainder	  of	  this	  section	  explores	  more	  closely	  the	  logic	  of	  escalation,	  evidence	  of	  countries	  willingness	  to	  resort	  to	  an	  escalatory	  strategy,	  and	  several	  features	  of	  modern	  war	  and	  the	  contemporary	  strategic	  context	  that	  exacerbate	  the	  core	  problem	  of	  escalation.	  	  
A.	  	  Logic	  of	  Escalation	  The	  basic	  rationale	  for	  a	  strategy	  of	  coercive	  nuclear	  escalation	  rests	  on	  adversary	  perceptions	  of	  the	  looming	  costs	  of	  defeat	  in	  a	  conventional	  war,	  the	  likely	  benefits	  of	  escalation,	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  gambling	  for	  resurrection.	  	  
1.	  	  Potential	  Costs	  of	  Defeat	  The	  core	  national	  security	  problem	  for	  many	  countries	  is	  straightforward:	  how	  to	  keep	  more	  powerful	  enemies	  at	  bay.	  	  For	  relatively	  weak	  countries,	  military	  defeat	  can	  be	  disastrous.	  	  In	  some	  circumstances,	  battlefield	  losses	  are	  followed	  by	  conquest,	  brutal	  occupation,	  the	  loss	  of	  sovereignty,	  and	  sometimes	  genocide.	  	  But	  even	  when	  those	  terrible	  outcomes	  are	  avoided,	  military	  defeat	  is	  often	  disastrous	  for	  national	  leaders.	  
a.	  	  Regime	  Change	  and	  the	  Prospect	  of	  the	  Noose	  The	  desire	  to	  survive	  provides	  the	  simplest	  rationale	  for	  adversaries	  to	  resort	  to	  nuclear	  escalation.	  	  Although	  the	  United	  States	  rarely	  punishes	  defeated	  adversary	  societies,	  enemy	  leaders	  do	  not	  fare	  so	  well.	  	  Consider	  the	  consequences	  suffered	  by	  leaders	  of	  countries	  that	  recently	  fought	  the	  United	  States:	  Panamanian	  dictator	  Manuel	  Noriega	  has	  been	  in	  prison	  since	  the	  U.S.	  invasion	  of	  his	  country	  in	  1989.	  	  Slobodan	  Milošević,	  the	  president	  of	  Serbia	  and	  Yugoslavia	  during	  the	  1999	  U.S.-­‐led	  NATO	  bombing	  campaign	  of	  his	  country,	  died	  in	  his	  prison	  cell	  in	  The	  Hague	  while	  standing	  trial	  for	  war	  crimes;	  and	  the	  Bosnian	  Serb	  leaders	  Radovan	  Karadžić	  and	  Ratko	  Mladić	  are	  still	  in	  detention	  pending	  their	  own	  war	  crimes	  trials.	  	  Saddam	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Hussein,	  the	  Iraqi	  leader	  when	  the	  U.S.	  invaded	  and	  occupied	  his	  country	  in	  2003,	  was	  toppled,	  captured,	  and	  incarcerated	  in	  humiliating	  fashion,	  his	  sons	  and	  grandson	  were	  killed,	  and	  then	  he	  was	  hung	  in	  front	  of	  jeering	  enemies.	  	  More	  recently,	  in	  2011,	  the	  Libyan	  leader	  Muammar	  Qaddafi	  spent	  his	  final	  days	  hiding	  from	  U.S.-­‐supported	  rebels	  before	  being	  captured,	  beaten,	  and	  shot	  to	  death,	  along	  with	  his	  son	  and	  several	  dozens	  of	  his	  loyalists;	  another	  son	  and	  three	  grandchildren	  died	  in	  an	  earlier	  NATO	  airstrike	  on	  his	  family	  compound	  in	  Tripoli.	  	  Even	  when	  adversary	  leaders	  are	  “not	  targeted	  specifically”	  (as	  for	  example	  U.S.	  leaders	  claimed	  about	  the	  airstrikes	  on	  Qaddafi’s	  compound),	  military	  operations	  –	  especially	  those	  conducted	  by	  the	  United	  States	  –	  increasingly	  involve	  intense	  campaigns	  against	  enemy	  command-­‐and-­‐control	  facilities,	  leadership	  sites,	  and	  sensing	  platforms.	  	  These	  targets	  are	  destroyed	  in	  order	  to	  maximize	  military	  effectiveness,	  but	  doing	  so	  poses	  a	  direct	  threat	  to	  regime	  security	  –	  to	  the	  leaders	  themselves,	  their	  key	  political	  allies,	  and	  their	  families.	  	  In	  short,	  leaders	  who	  witness	  their	  militaries	  being	  destroyed,	  see	  their	  security	  services	  being	  savaged,	  and	  experience	  bombs	  raining	  down	  upon	  their	  command	  bunkers	  will	  feel	  great	  pressure	  to	  halt	  a	  war	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  	  	  
b.	  	  Stakes	  are	  Too	  Great	  Some	  adversaries	  may	  face	  big	  incentives	  to	  resort	  to	  coercive	  nuclear	  escalation	  even	  when	  they	  are	  not	  facing	  a	  direct	  existential	  threat	  to	  the	  regime	  or	  individual	  leaders.	  	  Instead,	  nuclear	  use	  might	  seem	  appealing	  in	  cases	  where	  an	  adversary	  perceives	  enormous	  political	  or	  strategic	  stakes	  in	  the	  conflict.	  	  For	  example,	  a	  war	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  China	  over	  Taiwan	  would	  not	  make	  leaders	  in	  Beijing	  fear	  “conquest”	  in	  the	  narrow	  sense	  of	  the	  term,	  but	  it	  would	  raise	  the	  risk	  of	  the	  loss	  of	  highly	  valued	  territory	  (Taiwan)	  –	  a	  vital	  national	  interest,	  according	  to	  official	  Chinese	  declarations.	  	  While	  not	  as	  bad	  as	  complete	  conquest	  and	  occupation,	  such	  an	  outcome	  would	  likely	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  major	  and	  unacceptable	  loss.	  	  If	  Chinese	  leaders	  are	  to	  be	  believed	  that	  they	  see	  Taiwan	  as	  an	  inseparable	  part	  of	  China,	  and	  especially	  if	  the	  people	  of	  China	  feel	  the	  same	  way,	  it	  may	  be	  too	  costly	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for	  leaders	  in	  Beijing	  to	  accept	  defeat	  in	  a	  war	  over	  Taiwan,	  especially	  if	  the	  consequences	  might	  be	  Taiwanese	  independence.	  	  Similarly,	  if	  North	  Korea	  begins	  a	  new	  war	  on	  the	  Peninsula,	  a	  Combined	  Forces	  Command	  advance	  to	  seize	  artillery	  positions	  a	  few	  dozen	  kilometers	  north	  of	  the	  DMZ	  might	  seem	  like	  a	  “limited”	  military	  operation	  to	  leaders	  in	  Seoul	  and	  Washington.	  	  But	  it	  could	  well	  be	  perceived	  as	  an	  unacceptable	  challenge	  to	  North	  Korean	  interests.	  	  It	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  conceive	  the	  high	  stakes	  from	  the	  Kim	  regime’s	  perspective:	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  army	  and	  its	  artillery	  threat	  to	  Seoul	  would	  essentially	  eliminate	  North	  Korea’s	  only	  other	  real	  bargaining	  chip	  besides	  nuclear	  weapons.	  
c.	  	  Danger	  of	  Coup	  Not	  only	  do	  conventionally	  weaker	  adversaries	  face	  great	  pressure	  to	  create	  battlefield	  stalemate	  before	  they	  are	  conquered	  and	  their	  leaders	  imprisoned	  or	  killed	  –	  or	  before	  they	  lose	  unacceptably	  high	  stakes	  –	  they	  must	  do	  so	  quickly	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  a	  conflict.	  	  A	  limited	  conventional	  defeat	  that	  “merely”	  destroys	  a	  large	  fraction	  of	  a	  country’s	  military,	  or	  substantially	  degrades	  the	  institutions	  that	  ensure	  government	  control	  (for	  example,	  the	  leadership’s	  security	  force,	  domestic	  intelligence	  services,	  internal	  security	  troops,	  and	  party	  militias),	  could	  trigger	  a	  wartime	  or	  post-­‐war	  coup.	  	  The	  impetus	  for	  overthrowing	  the	  defeated	  regime	  could	  come	  from	  military	  leaders	  and	  units	  who	  feel	  dishonored	  or	  betrayed,	  from	  regime	  security	  personnel	  who	  sense	  weakness	  at	  the	  top,	  or	  from	  a	  critical	  mass	  of	  an	  enraged	  and	  humiliated	  population	  –	  but	  the	  grim	  outcome	  for	  the	  leadership	  would	  be	  the	  same.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  Pyongyang	  government	  might	  fall	  even	  if	  the	  stakes	  are	  otherwise	  perceived	  as	  limited	  by	  all	  sides,	  because	  the	  damage	  inflicted	  on	  the	  North	  Korean	  military	  and	  security	  services	  may	  sufficiently	  weaken	  the	  regime	  and	  trigger	  a	  coup	  or	  revolution.	  	  Similarly,	  if	  the	  United	  States	  dealt	  an	  overwhelming	  defeat	  to	  the	  Iranian	  military	  during	  a	  conflict	  over	  the	  Strait	  of	  Hormuz,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  the	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Islamic	  Republic	  would	  survive	  the	  political	  turmoil	  likely	  to	  follow.	  	  Again,	  because	  the	  conquest	  of	  China	  is	  not	  plausible,	  many	  analysts	  assume	  that	  the	  escalation	  risks	  in	  a	  U.S.-­‐China	  clash	  are	  substantially	  muted.	  	  However,	  observers	  of	  Chinese	  politics	  have	  noted	  that	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  (CCP)	  no	  longer	  bases	  its	  legitimacy	  on	  communism,	  but	  rather	  on	  nationalism	  and	  the	  perception	  that	  the	  CCP	  has	  made	  China	  strong	  and	  globally	  respected	  –	  a	  peer	  of	  the	  western	  powers	  who	  victimized	  China.	  	  If	  during	  a	  military	  clash	  in	  the	  Pacific	  the	  United	  States	  inflicted	  a	  crushing	  defeat	  against	  the	  Chinese	  air	  force	  and	  navy,	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  CCP	  may	  reasonably	  question	  whether	  their	  government	  could	  survive	  the	  political	  repercussions	  stemming	  from	  popular	  or	  military	  humiliation	  and	  anger.	  	  All	  of	  these	  logics	  for	  escalation	  are	  worth	  highlighting	  because	  doing	  so	  shows	  how	  many	  real-­‐world	  scenarios	  could	  plausibly	  materialize	  and	  exhibit	  escalatory	  pressures.	  	  Specifically,	  the	  problem	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  a	  single	  case	  where	  the	  adversary	  regime	  is	  likely	  to	  perceive	  any	  military	  campaign	  as	  a	  total	  war	  –	  i.e.,	  North	  Korea	  –	  but	  rather	  could	  apply	  across	  the	  full	  range	  of	  plausible	  conflicts	  involving	  the	  United	  States	  (including	  with	  China,	  someday	  perhaps	  Iran,	  or	  even	  Russia).	  	  Moreover,	  as	  we	  discuss	  below,	  identifying	  a	  continuum	  of	  risks	  –	  based	  on	  how	  terrible	  conventional	  defeat	  will	  be	  perceived	  by	  adversaries	  –	  should	  allow	  U.S.	  planners	  to	  better	  identify	  relevant	  tradeoffs	  and	  risks.	  	  But	  there	  is	  another	  key	  dimension	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  adversary	  nuclear	  escalation	  that	  must	  be	  understood:	  the	  potential	  benefits	  that	  adversary	  leaders	  are	  likely	  to	  perceive	  when	  resorting	  to	  this	  strategy.	  	  
2.	  	  Potential	  Benefits	  of	  Escalation	  Leaders	  in	  facing	  the	  prospect	  of	  imminent	  defeat	  in	  a	  conventional	  war	  have	  compelling	  reasons	  to	  escalate	  coercively,	  with	  nuclear	  weapons,	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  ceasefire.	  	  But	  wouldn’t	  the	  use	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  by	  a	  weak	  country	  against	  a	  strong	  one	  incite	  a	  devastating	  nuclear	  response,	  rather	  than	  a	  truce?	  	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  war	  on	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula,	  wouldn’t	  North	  Korean	  use	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	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against	  the	  Republic	  of	  Korea,	  Japan,	  or	  U.S.	  military	  forces	  in	  the	  region	  trigger	  a	  devastating	  U.S.	  nuclear	  retaliatory	  strike?	  	  If	  so,	  then	  nuclear	  escalation	  would	  simply	  turn	  a	  conventional	  defeat	  into	  an	  even	  worse	  nuclear	  disaster.	  	  So,	  how	  could	  coercive	  nuclear	  escalation	  work?	  	  The	  answer	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  negative	  costs	  of	  defeat	  are	  just	  one	  side	  of	  the	  logical	  coin	  behind	  a	  coercive	  escalation	  strategy.	  	  On	  the	  flip	  side	  are	  the	  potential	  
benefits	  of	  undertaking	  this	  strategy	  –	  the	  reasons	  for	  believing	  such	  a	  strategy	  might	  work.	  	  The	  power	  (and	  thus	  appeal)	  of	  a	  coercive	  nuclear	  escalatory	  strategy	  by	  the	  weaker	  side	  comes	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  would	  leave	  the	  stronger	  side	  with	  a	  set	  of	  entirely	  grim	  response	  options.	  	  It	  is	  because	  all	  of	  those	  options	  are	  unattractive	  that	  an	  adversary	  will	  be	  tempted	  to	  escalate	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  Consider	  a	  hypothetical	  example:	  a	  conflict	  on	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula.	  	  Regardless	  of	  why	  or	  how	  it	  started,	  most	  analysts	  expect	  that	  the	  conventional	  battle	  will	  quickly	  favor	  the	  U.S.-­‐ROK	  alliance.	  	  If	  or	  when	  allied	  forces	  began	  to	  move	  north	  of	  the	  DMZ,	  leaders	  in	  Pyongyang	  would	  face	  a	  stark	  choice.	  	  They	  could	  allow	  the	  conflict	  to	  continue	  on	  its	  course	  and	  risk	  a	  fate	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  Qadaffi	  and	  Hussein,	  or	  they	  could	  seek	  the	  means	  to	  compel	  the	  United	  States	  and	  South	  Korea	  to	  immediately	  halt	  offensive	  operations.	  	  Nuclear	  escalation	  would	  be	  the	  most	  obvious	  means,	  and	  could	  take	  many	  possible	  forms:	  	  Pyongyang	  might	  begin	  with	  just	  a	  statement	  demanding	  an	  immediate	  ceasefire,	  along	  with	  the	  threat	  of	  nuclear	  escalation.	  	  Or	  it	  could	  launch	  a	  missile	  armed	  with	  a	  nuclear	  warhead	  and	  detonate	  it	  harmlessly	  over	  the	  Sea	  of	  Japan.	  	  Or	  it	  could	  attempt	  a	  nuclear	  strike	  on	  a	  U.S.	  military	  base	  in	  the	  region,	  such	  as	  Kadena	  Air	  Base	  on	  the	  island	  of	  Okinawa,	  Japan.	  	  North	  Korea	  could	  even	  try	  to	  strike	  a	  Japanese	  or	  South	  Korean	  city.	  	  Regardless	  of	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  initial	  step,	  the	  key	  aspect	  of	  a	  coercive	  nuclear	  escalatory	  operation	  is	  not	  the	  initial	  strike,	  but	  the	  threat	  of	  what	  is	  to	  come.	  	  In	  this	  scenario,	  after	  the	  initial	  escalatory	  step,	  Pyongyang	  could	  then	  declare	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  ROK	  must	  cease	  military	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operations	  against	  North	  Korea	  immediately	  –	  or	  else	  North	  Korea	  will	  destroy	  half-­‐a-­‐dozen	  Japanese	  cities.	  	  Some	  analysts	  might	  assume	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  respond	  at	  this	  point	  with	  a	  devastating	  nuclear	  counter-­‐strike	  –	  especially	  if	  the	  North	  Korean	  coercive	  strategy	  involved	  actual	  nuclear	  use,	  rather	  than	  just	  the	  threat	  of	  doing	  so.	  	  But	  it	  is	  enlightening	  to	  consider	  carefully	  the	  options	  that	  a	  U.S.	  president	  would	  confront	  in	  such	  circumstances.	  	  What	  options	  would	  a	  U.S.	  president	  have	  if	  North	  Korea	  used	  nuclear	  weapons	  coercively	  during	  a	  conventional	  war?	  	  How	  would	  the	  United	  States	  respond,	  for	  example,	  to	  North	  Korean	  nuclear	  attacks	  on	  Kadena	  Air	  Base	  and	  a	  Japanese	  city	  that	  killed	  several	  thousand	  Americans	  and	  two	  or	  three	  times	  that	  many	  Japanese?	  	  How	  would	  a	  U.S.	  president	  address	  Pyongyang’s	  threat	  to	  launch	  further	  strikes	  on	  Japanese	  cities	  unless	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  ROK	  accept	  a	  cease-­‐fire	  and	  halt	  their	  military	  campaign?	  	  In	  such	  a	  scenario,	  four	  principal	  courses	  of	  action	  would	  be	  available,	  and	  all	  of	  them	  are	  grim.	  
a.	  	  Option	  1:	  Accept	  Ceasefire	  One	  possible	  response	  to	  North	  Korean	  nuclear	  escalation	  is	  to	  simply	  halt	  the	  military	  campaign	  and	  accept	  a	  ceasefire.	  	  After	  all,	  U.S.	  leaders	  might	  well	  decide	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  on	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula	  for	  which	  it	  would	  be	  worth	  fighting	  a	  nuclear	  war.	  	  A	  nuclear	  exchange	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  North	  Korea	  would	  likely	  kill	  large	  numbers	  of	  Koreans	  (especially	  if	  North	  Korean	  nuclear	  sites	  were	  near	  populated	  areas),	  and	  could	  lead	  to	  substantial	  retaliation	  against	  U.S.	  regional	  allies.	  	  If	  Japan	  or	  other	  allies	  in	  the	  region	  were	  subsequently	  struck,	  it	  would	  likely	  mark	  the	  end	  of	  the	  U.S.	  alliance	  network	  in	  East	  Asia,	  as	  well	  as	  undermine	  U.S.	  nuclear	  umbrella	  commitments	  to	  dozens	  of	  other	  countries.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  halting	  the	  conflict	  before	  further	  nuclear	  use	  would	  likely	  leave	  the	  North	  Korean	  regime	  completely	  isolated.	  	  The	  international	  blowback,	  including	  pressure	  on	  third	  party	  patrons	  to	  withdraw	  assistance	  to	  Pyongyang	  to	  punish	  the	  regime	  for	  its	  behavior,	  would	  perhaps	  even	  bring	  North	  Korea	  close	  to	  collapse.	  	  Most	  important,	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  the	  potentially	  huge	  political	  and	  strategic	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implications	  of	  buckling	  to	  nuclear	  coercion	  could	  be	  mitigated.	  	  For	  example,	  before	  accepting	  the	  “ceasefire”	  option,	  the	  United	  States	  might	  levy	  a	  symbolic	  –	  but	  politically	  useful	  –	  nuclear	  response	  (e.g.,	  responding	  to	  a	  North	  Korean	  strike	  on	  Kadena	  Air	  Base	  with	  a	  nuclear	  response	  against	  one	  or	  more	  North	  Korean	  military	  facilities)	  before	  halting	  military	  operations.	  	  The	  downsides	  of	  accepting	  a	  ceasefire	  would	  be	  significant,	  however.	  	  Negotiating	  a	  settlement	  after	  suffering	  a	  nuclear	  strike	  (or	  after	  receiving	  an	  explicit	  nuclear	  threat)	  might	  be	  very	  costly	  politically	  –	  both	  for	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  its	  global	  allies	  and	  for	  the	  U.S.	  president	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  American	  electorate.	  	  More	  substantively,	  U.S.	  leaders	  would	  worry	  about	  setting	  a	  precedent	  whereby	  a	  relatively	  weak	  state	  coerced	  the	  ceasefire	  it	  needed	  by	  threatening	  or	  employing	  nuclear	  weapons	  against	  U.S.	  forces	  and	  personnel.	  	  Such	  a	  strategy	  could	  trigger	  a	  new	  wave	  of	  proliferation	  –	  not	  only	  by	  adversaries,	  but	  also	  by	  allies	  that	  lose	  faith	  in	  the	  U.S.	  nuclear	  umbrella.	  	  And	  while	  symbolic	  escalation	  and	  subterfuge	  might	  make	  the	  “deal”	  politically	  palatable	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  when	  the	  dust	  settled	  it	  would	  become	  apparent	  that	  North	  Korea’s	  strategy	  of	  coercive	  escalation	  had	  worked	  well.	  
b.	  	  Option	  2:	  Punitive	  Retaliation	  A	  second	  option	  for	  responding	  to	  adversary	  nuclear	  escalation	  would	  be	  to	  immediately	  launch	  a	  punitive	  nuclear	  attack	  aimed	  at	  killing	  the	  North	  Korean	  regime’s	  leaders	  and	  destroying	  the	  remaining	  institutions	  of	  the	  North	  Korean	  state.	  	  After	  the	  retaliatory	  strike,	  South	  Korean	  and	  U.S.	  forces	  would	  march	  toward	  Pyongyang	  as	  soon	  as	  conditions	  allowed.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  response	  would	  be	  to	  send	  a	  clear	  message	  to	  the	  world:	  nuclear	  escalation	  will	  beget	  a	  horrifying	  response.	  	  The	  disadvantages	  of	  this	  second	  course	  of	  action	  are	  substantial.	  	  First,	  and	  most	  obviously,	  the	  United	  States	  would	  be	  killing	  large	  numbers	  of	  innocent	  people.	  	  Hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  North	  Korean	  civilians	  would	  be	  killed	  in	  response	  to	  acts	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committed	  by	  a	  small	  coterie	  of	  authoritarian	  leaders.	  	  Moreover,	  nuclear	  strikes	  aimed	  at	  deeply	  buried	  leadership	  bunkers	  would	  require	  “ground	  bursts”	  –	  detonations	  well	  below	  any	  altitude	  that	  would	  avert	  fallout	  –	  and	  would	  therefore	  spread	  highly	  radioactive	  material	  across	  the	  region.	  	  Depending	  on	  the	  location	  of	  the	  bunkers	  and	  wind	  patterns,	  lethal	  fallout	  would	  likely	  scatter	  across	  South	  Korea,	  and	  possibly	  into	  Japan	  or	  China	  –	  possibly	  killing	  more	  South	  Korean	  civilians	  than	  North	  Koreans.	  	  	  Second,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  punitive	  nuclear	  strikes	  would	  do	  much	  to	  shape	  North	  Korean	  behavior.	  	  If	  the	  threat	  of	  nuclear	  retaliation	  is	  meant	  to	  deter	  escalation	  from	  happening	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  or	  if	  retaliation	  is	  meant	  to	  send	  a	  strong	  deterrent	  signal	  to	  future	  adversaries,	  presumably	  the	  adversary	  regime	  must	  have	  some	  reason	  to	  refrain	  from	  escalation.	  	  But	  the	  logic	  of	  escalation	  is	  based	  on	  terrible	  consequences	  that	  adversaries	  expect	  to	  face	  if	  they	  do	  not	  escalate:	  that	  is,	  defeat,	  regime	  change,	  and	  possible	  death.	  	  Simply	  put,	  it	  is	  not	  obvious	  that	  nuclear	  strikes	  would	  add	  much	  pain	  to	  the	  expected	  costs	  of	  continued	  conventional	  war.	  	  Finally,	  a	  nuclear	  punitive	  strike	  would	  not	  solve	  the	  major	  dilemma	  at	  hand:	  North	  Korean	  nuclear	  forces	  would	  presumably	  already	  have	  been	  dispersed	  and	  could	  still	  carry	  out	  escalatory	  nuclear	  strikes.	  	  In	  short,	  a	  visceral	  “bomb	  them	  back	  to	  the	  stone	  age”	  response	  is	  problematic	  on	  many	  dimensions.	  
c.	  	  Option	  3:	  Continue	  Conventional	  Campaign	  A	  third	  option	  would	  be	  to	  accelerate	  the	  conventional	  offensive	  toward	  Pyongyang	  to	  end	  the	  war	  and	  capture	  the	  North	  Korean	  leadership	  as	  rapidly	  as	  possible.	  	  The	  advantage	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  that	  it	  reinforces	  official	  U.S.	  nuclear	  policy	  rhetoric:	  by	  not	  submitting	  to	  coercion,	  and	  by	  not	  responding	  in	  kind,	  the	  U.S.	  response	  would	  demonstrate	  that	  nuclear	  weapons	  are	  both	  abhorrent	  and	  ineffective	  tools	  of	  statecraft.	  	  The	  subsequent	  trials	  of	  surviving	  senior	  North	  Korean	  leaders	  would	  demonstrate	  to	  the	  leaders	  of	  other	  weak	  states	  that	  nuclear	  escalation	  is	  not	  a	  viable	  way	  to	  escape	  the	  calamity	  of	  military	  defeat.	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The	  disadvantages	  of	  this	  strategy	  are	  enormous.	  	  The	  strategy	  would	  accept	  the	  risk	  that	  North	  Korea	  would	  carry	  out	  its	  threat	  and	  launch	  additional	  nuclear	  strikes	  against	  a	  half-­‐dozen	  allied	  cities.	  	  Relatedly,	  this	  course	  of	  action	  would	  presumably	  need	  to	  be	  implemented	  over	  the	  strenuous	  objections	  of	  allied	  governments.	  	  The	  consequence	  would	  likely	  be	  the	  end	  of	  the	  U.S.-­‐led	  alliance	  network	  in	  East	  Asia.	  	  More	  broadly,	  if	  the	  United	  States	  ignores	  the	  pleas	  of	  a	  critical	  ally,	  and	  the	  consequences	  were	  the	  destruction	  of	  several	  allied	  cities,	  many	  other	  U.S.	  allies	  around	  the	  world	  would	  likely	  rethink	  their	  tight	  military	  ties	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and	  revisit	  their	  decision	  to	  live	  under	  the	  U.S.	  nuclear	  umbrella.	  
d.	  	  Option	  4:	  Counterforce	  Strike	  The	  fourth	  option	  would	  be	  to	  respond	  to	  nuclear	  escalation	  with	  a	  major	  military	  strike	  against	  known	  and	  suspected	  North	  Korean	  nuclear	  targets	  to	  prevent	  the	  launch	  of	  additional	  weapons.	  	  A	  counterforce	  strike	  could	  be	  conducted	  with	  conventional	  weapons,	  nuclear	  weapons,	  or	  a	  mixture	  of	  the	  two,	  with	  various	  implications	  for	  the	  promptness	  of	  destroying	  the	  intended	  targets	  and	  the	  likelihood	  of	  destroying	  them	  all.	  	  This	  option,	  like	  the	  others,	  would	  rely	  on	  imperfect	  missile	  defenses	  to	  help	  with	  any	  North	  Korean	  weapons	  surviving	  a	  U.S.	  strike.	  	  As	  with	  the	  first	  two	  options,	  a	  rapid	  conventional	  advance	  on	  Pyongyang	  to	  conquer	  the	  regime	  and	  seize	  any	  surviving	  leaders	  would	  follow.	  	  	  	  The	  advantage	  of	  this	  option	  is	  that	  it	  would	  avoid	  caving	  in	  to	  nuclear	  blackmail,	  and	  it	  would	  take	  direct	  action	  to	  protect	  U.S.	  allies	  as	  much	  as	  possible.	  	  Traditionally,	  a	  “counterforce”	  campaign	  such	  as	  this	  was	  evaluated	  based	  on	  its	  ability	  to	  “get	  ‘em	  all”	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  strategy	  had	  to	  promise	  near	  100%	  success	  to	  be	  even	  considered	  a	  plausible	  option.	  	  (Surviving	  nuclear	  warheads	  would	  presumably	  be	  launched	  in	  retaliation.)	  	  Today,	  although	  there	  might	  be	  scenarios	  in	  which	  the	  United	  States	  and	  others	  could	  destroy	  every	  adversary	  nuclear	  asset,	  that	  criteria	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  sacrosanct.	  	  After	  all,	  if	  all	  the	  other	  alternatives	  discussed	  above	  entail	  the	  prospect	  of	  U.S.	  forces	  or	  allies	  being	  hit	  with	  additional	  nuclear	  weapons,	  
	   18	  
then	  100%	  success	  can	  hardly	  be	  considered	  a	  meaningful	  threshold	  for	  choosing	  this	  option.	  	  	  The	  disadvantages	  of	  this	  option	  are	  also	  substantial,	  however.	  	  First,	  a	  counterforce	  attack	  would	  not	  be	  a	  small	  operation.	  	  It	  would	  likely	  require	  prompt	  attacks	  on	  scores	  of	  targets	  across	  North	  Korea	  in	  order	  to	  rapidly	  destroy	  suspected	  nuclear	  storage	  sites,	  military	  command	  and	  control,	  mobile	  missile	  garrisons,	  and	  tunnel	  entrances	  which	  may	  be	  associated	  with	  North	  Korea’s	  nuclear	  weapons	  or	  missile	  launchers.	  	  The	  nuclear	  component	  of	  the	  attack	  might	  involve	  several	  dozen	  –	  or	  more	  –	  U.S.	  weapons.	  	  Second,	  depending	  upon	  the	  details	  of	  the	  U.S.	  operation,	  and	  the	  location	  of	  North	  Korean	  targets,	  the	  U.S.	  strikes	  could	  kill	  a	  large	  number	  of	  North	  Koreans.	  	  (This	  would	  probably	  be	  the	  case	  even	  if	  U.S.	  strikes	  did	  not	  generate	  regional	  radioactive	  fallout,	  as	  in	  the	  counter-­‐leadership	  –	  or	  punitive	  –	  option	  described	  above).	  	  A	  third	  disadvantage	  is	  that	  a	  counterforce	  strike	  might	  not	  destroy	  every	  North	  Korean	  nuclear	  weapon;	  some	  weapons	  might	  survive	  and	  be	  used	  against	  U.S.	  allies.	  	  Worst	  of	  all,	  if	  this	  option	  leads	  to	  additional	  strikes	  on	  U.S.	  forces,	  allies,	  or	  even	  the	  U.S.	  homeland,	  the	  U.S.	  might	  eventually	  be	  compelled	  to	  accept	  a	  ceasefire	  anyway.	  	  This	  option,	  therefore,	  like	  the	  first	  three,	  accepts	  a	  high	  likelihood	  of	  one	  or	  more	  allied	  cities	  being	  destroyed,	  along	  with	  subsequent	  damage	  to	  the	  U.S.	  global	  alliance	  network	  and	  grand	  strategy.	  	  This	  option	  becomes	  more	  perilous	  the	  closer	  that	  North	  Korea	  moves	  toward	  deploying	  long-­‐range	  ballistic	  missiles	  that	  can	  target	  U.S.	  cities,	  as	  well	  as	  regional	  allies.	  	  In	  sum,	  all	  of	  the	  response	  options	  in	  this	  scenario	  are	  grim	  –	  which	  is	  precisely	  why	  a	  desperate	  adversary	  will	  see	  the	  logic	  of	  resorting	  to	  a	  nuclear	  escalatory	  strategy.	  	  Relatively	  weak	  states	  will	  face	  powerful	  incentives	  to	  use	  nuclear	  weapons	  against	  the	  strong	  during	  a	  conventional	  war	  in	  order	  to	  induce	  stalemate.	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3.	  	  Gambling	  for	  Resurrection	  Skeptics	  of	  the	  danger	  of	  adversary	  nuclear	  escalation	  might	  argue	  that	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  strategy	  poses	  bad	  options	  for	  the	  other	  side,	  it	  is	  inconceivable	  that	  a	  rational	  adversary	  could	  be	  confident	  the	  strategy	  would	  work.	  	  At	  best,	  nuclear	  escalation	  would	  constitute	  an	  epic	  gamble	  –	  a	  nearly	  suicidal	  long	  shot	  at	  producing	  a	  ceasefire.	  	  At	  worst,	  such	  a	  strategy	  would	  merely	  constitute	  choosing	  among	  equally	  fatal	  poisons	  –	  replacing	  the	  prospect	  of	  regime	  change	  after	  conventional	  defeat	  with	  that	  of	  regime	  destruction	  through	  nuclear	  retaliation.	  	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  a	  coercive	  nuclear	  escalatory	  strategy	  has	  many	  drawbacks.	  	  It	  could	  well	  end	  up	  being	  suicidal,	  counterproductive,	  or	  simply	  ineffective.	  	  But	  what	  skeptics	  fail	  to	  appreciate	  is	  that	  leaders	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  suffering	  a	  conventional	  defeat	  will	  likely	  find	  very	  attractive	  even	  a	  small	  chance	  that	  escalation	  will	  generate	  a	  ceasefire	  if	  the	  outcome	  of	  not	  escalating	  appears	  to	  be	  defeat,	  removal	  from	  office,	  and	  punishment	  (ranging	  from	  exile	  to	  death).	  	  The	  baseline	  expectation	  of	  doing	  nothing	  is	  essentially	  defeat	  and	  destruction.	  	  Leaders	  facing	  such	  a	  prospect	  are	  likely	  to	  “gamble	  for	  resurrection”	  –	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  escalate	  the	  conflict	  in	  the	  hopes	  of	  a	  dramatic	  reversal	  of	  fortune.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  leaders	  facing	  conventional	  defeat	  on	  the	  battlefield	  (and	  the	  likely	  consequences	  of	  such	  a	  defeat)	  have	  nothing	  much	  to	  risk	  in	  nuclear	  escalation,	  but	  they	  just	  might	  be	  able	  to	  stay	  in	  power	  and	  survive	  personally	  should	  the	  gamble	  be	  successful.	  	  
B.	  	  Evidence	  The	  logic	  of	  coercive	  nuclear	  escalation	  is	  convincing,	  but	  do	  countries	  actually	  calculate	  costs	  and	  benefits	  in	  the	  manner	  discussed	  above?	  	  Do	  leaders	  think	  this	  way	  in	  the	  real	  world?	  	  Do	  relatively	  weaker	  nuclear-­‐armed	  states	  that	  feel	  sufficiently	  threatened	  by	  a	  conventionally	  superior	  foe	  develop	  defense	  plans	  around	  the	  concept	  of	  coercive	  nuclear	  escalation?	  	  Do	  they	  create	  nuclear	  doctrines	  for	  wartime	  employment?	  	  In	  other	  words,	  do	  countries	  seem	  prepared	  to	  follow	  the	  cold-­‐blooded	  logic	  of	  coercive	  nuclear	  escalation?	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  Two	  factors	  should	  have	  a	  powerful	  effect	  on	  whether	  nuclear-­‐armed	  states	  develop	  coercive	  nuclear	  doctrines.	  	  First,	  countries	  should	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  view	  nuclear	  weapons	  in	  this	  manner	  if	  they	  expect	  to	  lose	  conventional	  wars.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  coercive	  nuclear	  doctrines	  should	  be	  far	  more	  appealing	  to	  the	  weak	  than	  to	  the	  strong.	  	  Second,	  these	  doctrines	  should	  be	  more	  attractive	  to	  states	  for	  which	  the	  consequences	  of	  conventional	  military	  defeat	  are	  dire.	  	  When	  the	  United	  States	  loses	  conventional	  wars	  –	  for	  example,	  in	  Vietnam,	  or	  arguably	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq	  –	  it	  may	  damage	  presidential	  approval,	  but	  the	  republic	  does	  not	  fall,	  and	  U.S.	  leaders	  are	  not	  hung	  on	  the	  gallows.	  	  For	  other	  states	  and	  leaders,	  defeat	  often	  brings	  terrible	  consequences.	  	  Even	  countries	  that	  do	  not	  fear	  military	  conquest	  might	  worry	  that	  a	  humiliating	  conventional	  defeat	  might	  trigger	  uprisings	  or	  coups,	  and	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  existing	  regime.	  	  Leaders	  of	  nuclear-­‐armed	  states	  who	  fear	  that	  conventional	  military	  defeat	  could	  lead	  to	  terrible	  consequences	  for	  themselves	  or	  their	  country	  should	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  develop	  coercive	  nuclear	  doctrines	  than	  those	  who	  do	  not	  share	  this	  fear.	  	  In	  fact,	  historical	  and	  contemporary	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  the	  nuclear-­‐weapon	  states	  that	  worry	  most	  about	  calamitous	  military	  defeat	  tend	  to	  develop	  coercive	  nuclear	  doctrines	  to	  give	  them	  the	  capability	  to	  stalemate	  their	  most-­‐threatening	  adversary.	  	  The	  NATO	  alliance	  thought	  this	  way	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  When	  NATO	  felt	  unable	  to	  defend	  itself	  adequately	  from	  a	  major	  conventional	  attack	  from	  the	  Soviet-­‐led	  Warsaw	  Pact,	  it	  adopted	  a	  coercive	  nuclear	  doctrine.	  	  Tellingly,	  when	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  shifted	  –	  that	  is,	  when	  the	  Russian	  conventional	  threat	  to	  Western	  Europe	  largely	  disappeared	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  –	  so	  did	  the	  views	  of	  many	  alliance	  members	  about	  NATO’s	  nuclear	  doctrine,	  and	  even	  about	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  weapons	  they	  recently	  relied	  upon	  themselves.	  	  The	  only	  members	  of	  NATO	  who	  face	  the	  real	  possibility	  of	  disastrous	  military	  defeat	  today	  –	  the	  Baltic	  countries	  –	  are	  the	  same	  ones	  who	  most	  strongly	  favor	  retaining	  NATO’s	  forward-­‐deployed	  tactical	  nuclear	  weapons	  (B61	  bombs	  deployed	  in	  Europe).	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Meanwhile,	  Russia	  has	  shifted	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction.	  	  During	  the	  Cold	  War,	  Russia	  at	  least	  rhetorically	  proclaimed	  a	  doctrine	  of	  “no	  first	  use,”	  but	  now	  that	  the	  military	  balance	  has	  shifted	  sharply	  against	  them	  Russian	  officials	  have	  publicly	  stated	  that	  they	  rely	  upon	  tactical	  and	  theater	  nuclear	  weapons	  to	  balance	  against	  the	  superior	  military	  forces	  of	  an	  unspecified	  powerful	  alliance.	  	  Since	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Russia’s	  conventional	  military	  capabilities	  have	  significantly	  deteriorated,	  leading	  it	  to	  adopt	  a	  doctrine	  of	  nuclear	  “de-­‐escalation”	  –	  the	  use	  of	  limited	  nuclear	  strikes	  to	  compel	  a	  cease-­‐fire	  and	  return	  to	  the	  status	  quo	  in	  a	  conventional	  war	  against	  a	  militarily	  superior	  adversary.3	  	  This	  was	  implicit	  in	  Russian	  President	  Vladimir	  Putin’s	  statement,	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  Russian	  military	  incursions	  into	  Ukraine	  and	  rising	  tensions	  with	  NATO,	  that	  Moscow	  does	  not	  intend	  to	  fight	  a	  “large-­‐scale”	  conventional	  conflict	  with	  the	  West:	  “I	  want	  to	  remind	  you	  that	  Russia	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  powerful	  nuclear	  nations.	  	  This	  is	  reality,	  not	  just	  words.”4	  	  Soon	  after	  this,	  Putin	  announced	  that	  Russia	  would	  counter	  NATO’s	  decision	  to	  deploy	  a	  rapid-­‐reaction	  conventional	  force	  to	  protect	  Eastern	  Europe	  with	  the	  development	  of	  new	  nuclear	  capabilities.5	  	  In	  short,	  there	  is	  widespread	  agreement	  among	  analysts	  that	  the	  deterioration	  of	  Russia’s	  conventional	  forces	  has	  led	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  its	  threshold	  for	  nuclear	  use	  in	  a	  conflict.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  See	  Nikolai	  N.	  Sokov,	  “Why	  Russia	  Calls	  a	  Limited	  Nuclear	  Strike	  ‘De-­‐escalation’,”	  Bulletin	  of	  the	  Atomic	  Scientists,	  March	  13,	  2014.	  	  According	  to	  Russia’s	  most	  recently	  released	  military	  doctrine	  (2010):	  “The	  Russian	  Federation	  reserves	  the	  right	  to	  utilize	  nuclear	  weapons	  in	  response	  to	  the	  utilization	  of	  nuclear	  and	  other	  types	  of	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  against	  it	  and	  (or)	  its	  allies,	  and	  also	  in	  the	  event	  of	  aggression	  against	  the	  Russian	  Federation	  involving	  the	  use	  of	  conventional	  weapons	  when	  the	  very	  existence	  of	  the	  state	  is	  under	  threat.”	  Text	  of	  “The	  Military	  Doctrine	  of	  the	  Russian	  Federation,”	  Russian	  Federation,	  February	  5,	  2010.	  	  Also	  see	  Alexei	  Arbatov,	  Vladimir	  Dvorkin,	  and	  Sergey	  Oznobishchev,	  “Contemporary	  Nuclear	  Doctrines,”	  Institute	  of	  World	  Economy	  and	  International	  Relations	  (IMEMO)	  and	  the	  Nuclear	  Threat	  Initiative	  (NTI),	  2010,	  pp.	  21-­‐27;	  Keir	  Giles,	  “The	  Military	  Doctrine	  of	  the	  Russian	  Federation	  2010,”	  Research	  Review,	  NATO	  Defense	  College,	  Rome,	  February	  2010.	  Also	  see	  Stephen	  J.	  Blank,	  ed.,	  Russian	  Nuclear	  Weapons:	  Past,	  Present,	  
and	  Future	  (Carlisle,	  PA:	  Strategic	  Studies	  Institute,	  November	  2011).	  4	  Greg	  Botelho	  and	  Laura	  Smith-­‐Spark,	  “Putin:	  You	  Better	  Not	  Come	  After	  a	  Nuclear-­‐Armed	  Russia,”	  CNN,	  August	  30,	  2014.	  5	  See	  Andrei	  Kokoshin,	  “Ensuring	  Strategic	  Stability	  in	  the	  Past	  and	  Present:	  Theoretical	  and	  Applied	  Questions,”	  Belfer	  Center	  for	  Science	  and	  International	  Affairs,	  Harvard	  University,	  June	  2011,	  pp.	  57-­‐58.	  
	   22	  
North	  Korea	  has	  not	  publicly	  articulated	  enough	  details	  to	  identify	  an	  explicit	  nuclear	  doctrine,	  but	  the	  Pyongyang	  government	  has	  overtly	  threatened	  to	  use	  nuclear	  weapons	  against	  South	  Korea,	  Japan,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  to	  ensure	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  regime	  if	  it	  were	  attacked.	  	  China	  is	  an	  outlier	  in	  that	  it	  officially	  avows	  a	  “no	  first	  use”	  nuclear	  doctrine	  despite	  the	  likelihood	  of	  conventional	  defeat	  to	  the	  United	  States	  in	  a	  major	  maritime	  conflict,	  and	  despite	  the	  highly	  negative	  consequences	  that	  such	  a	  defeat	  would	  bring	  for	  the	  ruling	  regime.	  	  (Of	  course,	  analysts	  have	  questioned	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  an	  official	  “no	  first	  use”	  policy	  reflects	  actual	  Chinese	  planning	  or	  means	  what	  Western	  observers	  assume	  it	  to	  mean.)	  	  	  	  Pakistan’s	  official	  nuclear	  doctrine	  is	  entirely	  consistent	  with	  a	  coercive	  nuclear	  strategy	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  conflict	  with	  India.	  	  Most	  experts	  believe	  Pakistan	  is	  prepared	  to	  launch	  nuclear	  strikes	  against	  advancing	  Indian	  forces	  if	  and	  when	  those	  forces	  cross	  into	  Pakistani	  territory.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Pakistan	  is	  a	  large	  country	  with	  a	  big	  population,	  and	  India	  has	  no	  desire	  to	  conquer	  and	  rule	  over	  180	  million	  Pakistani	  Muslims.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  most	  of	  Pakistan’s	  largest	  cities	  –	  including	  Karachi,	  Lahore,	  Faisalabad,	  Rawalpindi,	  and	  its	  capital	  Islamabad	  –	  are	  within	  approximately	  100	  miles	  of	  the	  border	  with	  India.	  	  Pakistan’s	  leaders	  reasonably	  worry	  that	  a	  major	  conventional	  war	  could	  lead	  India	  to	  seize,	  or	  isolate,	  major	  Pakistani	  cities,	  to	  be	  surrendered	  at	  some	  future	  time	  of	  India’s	  choosing	  –	  unless	  Pakistan	  can	  use	  nuclear	  escalatory	  threats	  to	  prevent	  this.	  	  In	  short,	  coercive	  nuclear	  escalation	  not	  only	  makes	  sense	  logically,	  but	  also	  appears	  to	  be	  reflected	  in	  the	  plans	  and	  doctrines	  of	  precisely	  those	  states	  that	  should	  be	  expected	  to	  adopt	  such	  a	  strategy.	  	  
C.	  	  Exacerbating	  Factors	  The	  principal	  danger	  of	  nuclear	  escalation	  stems	  from	  the	  desperation	  of	  weaker	  countries	  that	  fear	  losing	  conventional	  wars.	  	  But	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  “strong”	  matter,	  too,	  and	  may	  greatly	  exacerbate	  the	  likelihood	  of	  escalation.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	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nature	  of	  modern	  warfare	  and	  the	  unique	  strategic	  position	  of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  world	  today	  make	  the	  danger	  of	  escalation	  especially	  high.	  	  
1.	  	  The	  Nature	  of	  Modern	  Warfare	  Conventional	  war	  has	  changed	  dramatically	  over	  the	  past	  three	  decades	  as	  computers	  have	  become	  fully	  integrated	  into	  every	  facet	  of	  warfare.	  	  The	  computerization	  of	  weapons	  and	  warfare	  has	  changed	  nearly	  every	  aspect	  of	  combat:	  for	  example,	  command,	  communications,	  reconnaissance,	  navigation,	  and	  the	  precision	  with	  which	  weapons	  can	  be	  delivered	  against	  targets.	  	  As	  many	  observers	  have	  noted,	  modern	  high-­‐tech	  warfare	  can	  be	  devastatingly	  effective	  against	  conventionally	  armed	  foes.	  	  What	  has	  gone	  unnoticed,	  however,	  is	  that	  this	  high-­‐tech	  style	  of	  warfare	  is	  also	  highly	  escalatory.	  	  The	  computerization	  of	  warfare	  has	  had	  three	  overarching	  effects	  on	  combat.	  	  First,	  military	  forces	  now	  derive	  their	  effectiveness,	  more	  than	  ever	  before,	  from	  their	  ability	  to	  function	  as	  part	  of	  a	  network.	  	  Sensors,	  data	  processing	  facilities,	  commanders,	  and	  shooters	  are	  often	  widely	  dispersed;	  increasingly,	  generating	  combat	  power	  depends	  on	  a	  military’s	  ability	  to	  integrate	  information	  from	  multiple	  sources,	  make	  effective	  decisions,	  and	  then	  coordinate	  the	  actions	  of	  widely	  dispersed	  forces.	  	  Second,	  and	  following	  directly	  from	  the	  first	  point,	  the	  payoffs	  from	  disrupting	  an	  adversary’s	  “command	  and	  control”	  network	  have	  soared.	  	  For	  example,	  China’s	  newest	  anti-­‐ship	  missiles	  might	  be	  fearsome	  weapons,	  capable	  of	  destroying	  a	  war	  ship	  nearly	  2,000	  miles	  away	  on	  the	  open	  ocean	  –	  but	  that	  is	  only	  if	  every	  link	  in	  the	  sensor-­‐processing-­‐command-­‐shooter	  chain	  is	  intact.	  Severing	  or	  even	  delaying	  these	  links	  could	  render	  the	  missile	  system	  useless.	  	  Third,	  powerful	  states	  now	  have	  an	  unprecedented	  capacity	  to	  degrade	  an	  enemy’s	  command	  and	  control:	  thanks	  to	  long-­‐range	  precision	  weapons,	  and	  possibly	  also	  through	  unconventional	  means	  (e.g.,	  offensive	  cyber	  attacks).	  	  It	  would	  be	  an	  exaggeration	  to	  say	  that	  warfare	  is	  now	  entirely	  about	  degrading	  enemy	  command	  and	  control;	  rather,	  those	  operations	  typically	  open	  the	  door	  for	  decisive	  force-­‐on-­‐force	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engagements.	  	  But	  the	  efforts	  to	  gather	  and	  utilize	  information,	  coordinate	  actions	  among	  many	  units,	  and	  deny	  that	  intelligence	  and	  coordination	  to	  others,	  is	  a	  bigger	  part	  of	  modern	  warfare	  than	  ever	  before.	  	  Not	  surprisingly,	  every	  major	  U.S.	  military	  operation	  over	  the	  past	  twenty-­‐five	  years	  has	  begun	  with	  an	  intense	  effort	  to	  destroy	  adversary	  command	  and	  control.	  	  The	  initial	  U.S.	  air	  operations	  in	  the	  1991	  Persian	  Gulf	  War	  –	  which	  focused	  on	  degrading	  Iraqi	  surface-­‐to-­‐air	  radars	  and	  missile	  systems	  (to	  allow	  the	  United	  States	  unfettered	  access	  to	  Iraqi	  airspace),	  command	  posts,	  electricity,	  communications,	  and	  organs	  of	  government	  control	  –	  all	  aimed	  at	  denying	  the	  Iraqi	  leadership	  “situational	  awareness”	  and	  preventing	  them	  from	  coordinating	  their	  military	  forces	  in	  the	  field.	  	  This	  campaign	  included	  nearly	  two	  hundred	  strikes	  against	  Iraq’s	  leadership	  on	  the	  first	  night	  of	  the	  air	  war	  –	  representing	  an	  intense	  effort	  to	  kill	  the	  senior	  members	  in	  Saddam’s	  government.	  	  The	  air	  war	  against	  Serbia	  (1999)	  and	  during	  the	  Iraq	  War	  (2003)	  followed	  suit.	  	  Even	  the	  wars	  against	  enemies	  with	  more	  rudimentary	  command	  and	  controls	  systems	  –	  the	  Taliban	  leaders	  of	  Afghanistan	  (2001)	  and	  the	  brief	  campaign	  against	  Libya	  (2011)	  –	  began	  with	  attacks	  on	  the	  leadership	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  command	  and	  control	  their	  defense	  forces.	  	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  although	  this	  style	  of	  warfare	  can	  be	  very	  effective	  at	  producing	  one-­‐sided	  battlefield	  outcomes,	  it	  is	  also	  highly	  escalatory.	  	  If	  preventing	  escalation	  requires	  assuring	  enemy	  leaders	  that	  they	  will	  survive	  and	  remain	  in	  power	  after	  the	  war	  –	  if	  they	  do	  not	  escalate	  –	  then	  military	  campaigns	  must	  demonstrate	  that	  those	  promises	  will	  be	  met.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  these	  campaigns	  must	  allow	  leaders	  to	  see	  that	  their	  enemy’s	  military	  objectives	  are	  limited,	  and	  that	  their	  own	  critical	  political	  control	  organizations	  are	  not	  being	  destroyed.	  	  Attacks	  designed	  to	  cause	  the	  enemy’s	  command	  and	  control	  system	  to	  collapse,	  deny	  enemy	  leaders	  situational	  awareness	  of	  the	  battlefield,	  and	  kill	  the	  enemy	  leadership	  itself,	  undermine	  those	  goals.	  	  Attacks	  on	  enemy	  leadership,	  in	  particular,	  undermine	  escalation	  control.	  	  But	  attacks	  that	  spare	  these	  targets	  substantially	  reduce	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  conventional	  military	  forces.	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2.	  	  Attacks	  on	  Strategic	  Assets	  A	  related	  reason	  why	  modern	  warfare	  is	  escalatory	  stems	  from	  the	  powerful	  tendency	  among	  militaries	  to	  strike	  the	  most	  lethal	  weapons	  systems	  of	  their	  enemies.	  	  If	  the	  hope	  for	  preventing	  escalation	  is	  based	  on	  assuring	  adversary	  leaders	  that	  they	  can	  retain	  power	  as	  long	  as	  they	  do	  not	  use	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction,	  then	  attacks	  on	  their	  WMD	  sites	  and	  delivery	  systems	  clearly	  open	  the	  door	  for	  follow-­‐on	  operations	  to	  overthrow	  them.	  	  Stated	  differently,	  if	  an	  enemy’s	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  are	  its	  leaders’	  “get	  out	  of	  jail	  free”	  cards,	  then	  efforts	  to	  destroy	  those	  weapons	  will	  pose	  an	  existential	  threat	  –	  forcing	  him	  to	  escalate	  to	  coerce	  an	  end	  to	  those	  attacks.	  	  Attacking	  an	  enemy’s	  strategic	  deterrent	  assets	  is,	  therefore,	  highly	  escalatory.	  	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  military	  organizations	  in	  general,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  military	  as	  a	  case	  in	  point,	  have	  a	  powerful	  proclivity	  to	  target	  those	  weapons	  during	  war.	  	  The	  military	  logic	  for	  attacking	  adversary	  strategic	  assets	  is	  straightforward.	  	  During	  war,	  military	  organizations	  seek	  to	  destroy	  the	  enemy’s	  military,	  and	  they	  logically	  place	  a	  high	  priority	  on	  neutralizing	  those	  enemy	  forces	  that	  threaten	  to	  inflict	  the	  greatest	  damage.	  	  The	  notion	  of	  leaving	  intact	  an	  enemy’s	  most	  potent	  weapons	  is	  deeply	  counterintuitive	  for	  most	  military	  planners.	  	  Moreover,	  if	  military	  planners	  have	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  war	  is	  likely	  to	  escalate,	  then	  sparing	  an	  enemy’s	  most	  lethal	  weapons	  systems	  is	  foolish.	  	  Those	  systems	  should	  be	  attacked	  at	  the	  very	  outset	  of	  a	  war,	  before	  they	  have	  been	  used,	  and	  when	  (in	  many	  cases)	  they	  are	  most	  vulnerable.	  	  The	  reluctance	  to	  avoid	  targeting	  adversary	  strategic	  assets	  once	  shooting	  begins	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  U.S.	  military	  plans	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  Throughout	  the	  four	  decades	  of	  confrontation,	  U.S.	  nuclear	  war	  plans	  remained	  focused	  on	  so-­‐called	  “counterforce”	  attacks:	  destroying	  Soviet	  nuclear	  weapons.	  	  In	  the	  1950s,	  when	  the	  United	  States	  believed	  it	  could	  win	  a	  nuclear	  war,	  its	  plan	  for	  fighting	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  called	  for	  a	  massive	  nuclear	  disarming	  strike	  against	  every	  known	  Soviet	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nuclear	  target	  –	  and	  every	  “Sino-­‐Soviet	  Pact”	  airfield	  that	  could	  possibly	  launch	  a	  bomber.	  	  But	  even	  later	  in	  the	  Cold	  War,	  when	  the	  Soviets	  had	  achieved	  nuclear	  stalemate	  and	  the	  prospect	  of	  winning	  a	  nuclear	  war	  had	  become	  remote,	  NATO	  military	  plans	  still	  called	  for	  intense	  conventional	  attacks	  on	  Soviet	  nuclear	  forces.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  1980s,	  NATO’s	  plans	  called	  for	  operations	  against	  the	  Soviet	  “northern	  flank,”	  including	  operations	  by	  U.S.	  attack	  submarines	  to	  sink	  Soviet	  ballistic	  missile	  submarines	  at	  sea.6	  	  	  In	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world,	  each	  time	  the	  United	  States	  fights	  a	  regional	  war,	  a	  major	  element	  of	  the	  air	  campaign	  is	  to	  destroy	  the	  enemy’s	  strategic	  assets.	  	  In	  1991,	  the	  U.S.	  air	  campaign	  included	  intense	  attacks	  on	  Iraqi	  WMD	  sites	  and	  suspected	  delivery	  systems	  during	  the	  very	  first	  nights	  of	  bombing.	  	  The	  United	  States	  prioritized	  potential	  WMD	  targets	  in	  NATO	  operations	  against	  Serbia	  in	  1999,	  and	  once	  again	  in	  2003	  against	  Iraq;	  the	  air	  war	  plan	  for	  Operation	  Iraqi	  Freedom	  identified	  1,840	  targets	  associated	  with	  the	  delivery	  systems	  for	  Iraq’s	  (nonexistent)	  WMD	  program.7	  	  This	  emphasis	  on	  neutralizing	  adversary	  strategic	  assets	  is	  undiminished	  today.	  	  Among	  the	  highest	  priorities	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense	  are	  the	  development	  and	  improvement	  of	  sensors,	  weapons	  systems,	  and	  doctrines	  to	  facilitate	  the	  destruction	  of	  enemy	  strategic	  weapons.	  	  The	  effort	  to	  neutralize	  those	  forces	  spans	  all	  four	  services	  of	  the	  U.S.	  military,	  and	  includes	  every	  domain	  of	  warfare	  –	  including	  ballistic	  missile	  defenses,	  anti-­‐submarine	  warfare	  programs,	  long	  loiter-­‐time	  UAVs,	  prompt	  global	  conventional	  strike	  systems,	  offensive	  cyber	  operations,	  accurate	  nuclear	  weapons,	  and	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  efforts	  designed	  to	  allow	  the	  U.S.	  military	  to	  identify	  and	  rapidly	  target	  mobile	  missile	  launchers.	  	  The	  military	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Posen,	  Inadvertent	  Escalation,	  chapter	  4;	  and	  John	  J.	  Mearsheimer,	  “A	  Strategic	  Misstep:	  The	  Maritime	  Strategy	  and	  Deterrence	  in	  Europe.”	  	  7	  This	  figure	  counts	  the	  targets	  in	  the	  “WD”	  target	  sets	  in	  the	  “Joint	  Integrated	  Prioritized	  Target	  List,”	  832	  of	  which	  were	  eventually	  struck.	  	  	  “Operation	  Iraqi	  Freedom	  –	  By	  the	  Numbers,”	  Assessment	  and	  Analysis	  Division,	  USCENTAF,	  20	  April	  2003,	  pp.	  4-­‐5.	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explicit	  about	  the	  purpose	  of	  these	  efforts:	  to	  defeat	  enemy	  WMD	  –	  because	  they	  have	  no	  confidence	  that	  wartime	  deterrence	  will	  hold.	  	  The	  presumption	  that	  the	  job	  of	  the	  military	  is	  to	  neutralize	  or	  destroy	  the	  enemy’s	  most	  lethal	  weapons	  systems	  during	  war	  does	  not	  indicate	  some	  pathology	  within	  the	  U.S.	  military.	  	  Rather,	  it	  is	  based	  on	  a	  Clausewitzian	  understanding	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  warfare	  that	  is	  shared	  by	  many	  militaries	  around	  the	  world.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  direction	  of	  technology	  will	  make	  enemy	  strategic	  assets	  an	  even	  more	  alluring	  target	  in	  the	  future.	  	  Real-­‐time	  target	  intelligence	  from	  a	  range	  of	  sensors,	  stealthy	  aircraft	  and	  missiles,	  and	  highly	  precise	  weapons	  systems	  (plus	  unconventional	  military	  means)	  will	  make	  targeting	  enemy	  strategic	  forces	  seem	  easier	  and	  more	  attractive.	  	  
3.	  	  Differences	  Among	  Allies	  Another	  factor	  likely	  to	  exacerbate	  the	  nuclear	  escalation	  danger	  faced	  by	  the	  United	  States	  today	  and	  in	  the	  future	  relates	  to	  alliance	  relations.	  	  Simply	  put,	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  allies	  may	  view	  escalation	  risks	  differently,	  and	  may	  hold	  different	  perspectives	  on	  the	  tradeoffs	  between	  conventional	  military	  effectiveness	  and	  escalation	  control.	  	  Even	  close	  alliance	  relationships	  struggle	  to	  reconcile	  differences	  in	  their	  interests,	  in	  the	  threats	  they	  face,	  and	  in	  their	  perception	  of	  the	  enemy.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  share	  a	  commitment	  to	  their	  alliance	  and	  to	  the	  eventual	  unification	  of	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula.	  	  But	  underneath	  that	  fundamental	  agreement	  are	  differences.	  	  As	  much	  as	  the	  United	  States	  is	  committed	  to	  its	  South	  Korean	  ally,	  it	  is	  undeniable	  true	  that	  the	  timing	  and	  manner	  of	  Korean	  unification	  matter	  more	  to	  South	  Koreans	  than	  to	  Americans.	  	  They	  differ	  as	  well	  in	  the	  objective	  dangers	  the	  two	  countries	  face	  in	  their	  dispute	  with	  North	  Korea.	  	  Nuclear	  escalation	  during	  a	  war	  on	  the	  Peninsula	  would	  be	  a	  disaster	  for	  the	  United	  States;	  but	  it	  could	  utterly	  wreck	  South	  Korea.	  	  Finally,	  they	  differ	  in	  their	  politics	  and,	  possibly,	  in	  their	  perception	  of	  the	  enemy.	  	  If	  war	  erupted,	  the	  government	  in	  Seoul	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might	  be	  compelled	  by	  popular	  pressure	  to	  end,	  once	  and	  for	  all,	  the	  decades-­‐long	  confrontation	  that	  has	  divided	  Korea.	  	  Many	  South	  Koreans,	  seemingly	  disgusted	  by	  the	  government	  in	  the	  North,	  express	  profound	  doubts	  about	  the	  rationality	  and	  deterrability	  of	  the	  Pyongyang	  government.	  	  If	  one	  puts	  all	  these	  types	  of	  differences	  together,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  if	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  allies	  sometimes	  see	  deterrence	  differently,	  in	  peacetime	  and	  wartime.	  	  	  Finally,	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  allies	  around	  the	  world	  may	  differ	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  understanding	  of	  the	  dangers	  and	  consequences	  of	  nuclear	  escalation,	  and	  thus	  the	  risks	  that	  are	  worth	  undertaking	  in	  a	  conventional	  conflict.	  	  The	  U.S.	  is	  justifiably	  reluctant	  to	  share	  details	  about	  certain	  military	  capabilities	  –	  including	  those	  related	  to	  missile	  defense,	  cyber,	  and	  nuclear	  counterforce	  systems	  –	  as	  well	  as	  the	  limitations	  of	  those	  capabilities.	  	  This	  could	  mean	  that	  U.S.	  allies	  have	  an	  inflated	  sense	  of	  what	  exactly	  the	  United	  States	  military	  could	  do	  to	  prevent	  or	  mitigate	  adversary	  nuclear	  escalation.	  	  For	  example,	  some	  South	  Korean	  officials	  apparently	  believe	  that	  the	  U.S.	  nuclear	  umbrella	  effectively	  renders	  any	  North	  Korean	  nuclear	  escalatory	  strategy	  impotent	  or	  irrelevant.	  	  
4.	  	  War	  Plans	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  Escalation	  Control	  War	  plans	  are	  often	  created	  with	  the	  principal	  focus	  of	  maximizing	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  conventional	  operations	  in	  order	  to	  decisively	  defeat	  the	  adversary,	  not	  controlling	  operations	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  deterring	  escalation.	  	  Without	  deliberate	  guidance,	  these	  plans	  rarely	  draw	  sufficient	  and	  explicit	  attention	  to	  the	  tradeoffs	  between	  military	  effectiveness	  and	  escalation	  control.	  	  The	  result	  is	  that	  leaders	  may	  have	  difficulty	  discerning	  and	  evaluating	  these	  tradeoffs.	  	  The	  root	  of	  the	  problem	  stems	  from	  the	  fundamental	  difficulty	  that	  civilian	  and	  military	  leaders	  face	  in	  seeking	  to	  control	  military	  operations.	  	  Preventing	  escalation	  by	  carefully	  limiting	  conventional	  operations	  –	  for	  example,	  by	  striking	  certain	  targets	  but	  leaving	  others	  off-­‐limits,	  or	  by	  advancing	  to	  certain	  geographic	  lines	  but	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not	  beyond	  them	  –	  demands	  a	  level	  of	  fine-­‐grained	  control	  over	  military	  operations	  that	  is	  sometimes	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  nature	  of	  war	  in	  the	  21st	  century.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  some	  would	  label	  “controlled	  warfare”	  an	  oxymoron.	  	  	  	  When	  war	  erupts,	  finely	  calibrated	  control	  over	  military	  operations	  is	  nearly	  impossible.	  	  Modern	  conventional	  combat	  is	  so	  complex,	  and	  requires	  the	  coordination	  of	  so	  many	  people,	  that	  military	  organizations	  by	  necessity	  rely	  on	  standard	  operating	  procedures	  (SOPs).	  	  For	  example,	  military	  doctrine	  establishes	  a	  right	  way	  to	  suppress	  enemy	  air	  defenses,	  to	  protect	  one’s	  warships	  from	  enemy	  submarines,	  and	  to	  degrade	  an	  enemy’s	  military	  command-­‐and-­‐control.	  	  When	  civilian	  authorities	  order	  the	  military	  to	  conduct	  a	  military	  mission,	  commanders	  build	  complex	  operations	  on	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  SOPs.	  	  But	  as	  a	  result,	  leaders,	  especially	  civilian	  leaders,	  often	  do	  not	  appreciate	  the	  military	  implications	  of	  their	  orders	  and	  objectives,	  making	  control	  of	  operations	  far	  more	  difficult.	  	  	  The	  Cuban	  missile	  crisis	  provides	  many	  of	  the	  canonical	  examples	  of	  standard	  operating	  procedures	  impeding	  careful	  civilian	  control	  of	  the	  military.	  	  The	  White	  House	  developed	  a	  plan	  with	  two	  key	  components	  to	  defuse	  the	  crisis.	  	  First,	  U.S.	  leaders	  sought	  to	  buy	  time	  –	  by	  avoiding	  actions	  that	  would	  create	  an	  imminent	  clash	  between	  U.S.	  and	  Soviet	  forces	  that	  might	  rapidly	  escalate	  to	  war.	  	  To	  that	  end,	  a	  naval	  blockade	  was	  selected	  as	  the	  initial	  U.S.	  reaction,	  rather	  than	  airstrikes	  on	  missile	  sites,	  or	  an	  invasion	  of	  Cuba.	  	  The	  second	  principle	  component	  of	  the	  White	  House’s	  strategy	  was	  to	  begin	  military	  preparations	  for	  war,	  which	  the	  Soviets	  would	  observe,	  in	  order	  to	  pressure	  the	  Soviets	  to	  back	  down.	  	  	  The	  problem	  was	  that	  some	  of	  the	  policies	  the	  White	  House	  chose	  in	  order	  to	  implement	  its	  strategy	  triggered	  SOPs	  that	  contradicted	  core	  objectives.	  	  As	  part	  of	  the	  naval	  blockade	  of	  Cuba,	  the	  U.S.	  Navy	  –	  following	  SOPs	  –	  dropped	  signaling	  depth	  charges	  near	  Soviet	  submarines.	  	  This	  SOP,	  unknown	  to	  President	  Kennedy	  and	  top	  advisers	  until	  two	  days	  after	  the	  blockade	  was	  publically	  announced,	  cut	  against	  the	  President’s	  goal	  of	  avoiding	  a	  clash	  between	  U.S.	  and	  Soviet	  forces.	  	  (To	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make	  matters	  worse,	  U.S.	  officials	  were	  unaware	  that	  they	  were	  dropping	  depth	  charges	  against	  a	  nuclear-­‐armed	  submarine.)	  	  In	  fact,	  when	  Soviet	  submarines	  began	  to	  be	  bombarded,	  their	  initial	  impression	  was	  that	  they	  were	  under	  attack.	  	  In	  short,	  neither	  the	  U.S.	  president	  nor	  his	  civilian	  advisers	  were	  fully	  aware	  of	  what	  they	  had	  set	  in	  motion	  when	  they	  ordered	  the	  Navy	  to	  blockade	  Cuba.8	  	  	  In	  a	  second	  incident,	  President	  Kennedy	  ordered	  the	  Strategic	  Air	  Command	  (SAC)	  to	  raise	  the	  alert	  level	  of	  U.S.	  nuclear	  forces	  during	  the	  crisis,	  to	  signal	  the	  Soviets	  of	  U.S.	  seriousness.	  	  Unfortunately,	  officials	  in	  the	  White	  House	  did	  not	  know	  that	  the	  Strategic	  Air	  Command’s	  SOPs	  called	  for	  them	  –	  upon	  an	  alert	  –	  to	  send	  aircraft	  into	  Soviet	  airspace	  to	  gather	  pre-­‐strike	  reconnaissance	  on	  nuclear	  targets.	  	  Once	  again,	  efforts	  to	  wield	  military	  forces	  in	  a	  calibrated	  fashion	  to	  signal	  an	  opponent	  led	  to	  military	  actions	  that	  the	  leaders	  did	  not	  desire	  and	  which	  were	  seen	  as	  counter-­‐productive.	  	  More	  recent	  examples	  demonstrate	  the	  enduring	  nature	  of	  this	  problem.	  	  In	  the	  1991	  war	  against	  Iraq,	  the	  overarching	  U.S.	  objective	  was	  to	  conduct	  a	  limited	  offensive	  to	  eject	  Iraqi	  forces	  from	  Kuwait	  and	  heavily	  damage	  the	  Iraqi	  military	  –	  but	  not	  conquer	  Iraq.	  	  These	  limited	  objectives	  were	  critical	  for	  two	  reasons:	  U.S.	  officials	  did	  not	  want	  the	  United	  States	  to	  occupy	  Iraq,	  and	  they	  were	  trying	  to	  deter	  Iraq	  from	  using	  its	  stocks	  of	  chemical	  and	  biological	  weapons.	  	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  two	  highest	  priority	  targets	  in	  the	  U.S.	  air	  campaign	  were	  Saddam	  Hussein	  and	  the	  other	  most-­‐senior	  Iraqi	  leaders,	  as	  well	  as	  Iraq’s	  WMD	  and	  delivery	  systems.	  	  We	  may	  never	  know	  why	  Saddam	  Hussein	  did	  not	  respond	  by	  using	  WMD	  in	  1991,	  but	  as	  an	  example	  of	  an	  effort	  to	  limit	  war	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  preventing	  escalation,	  the	  U.S.	  air	  operation	  illustrates	  the	  grave	  problems	  ensuring	  that	  military	  operations	  are	  consistent	  with	  political	  objectives.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  William	  Burr	  and	  Thomas	  S.	  Blanton,	  eds.,	  The	  Submarines	  of	  October:	  U.S.	  and	  Soviet	  Naval	  
Encounters	  During	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis,	  National	  Security	  Archive	  Electronic	  Briefing	  Book	  No.	  75,	  October	  31,	  2002.	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The	  problem	  of	  ensuring	  the	  integration	  of	  military	  operations	  and	  strategic	  objectives	  endures	  today.	  	  Civilian	  officials	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Defense	  Department	  may	  believe	  they	  have	  provided	  sufficient	  guidance	  to	  war	  planners	  about	  the	  need	  to	  prevent	  and	  mitigate	  escalation	  dangers	  –	  for	  example,	  with	  the	  Guidance	  on	  the	  Employment	  of	  Forces	  (GEF),	  the	  principal	  directive	  from	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  that	  guides	  combatant	  commanders	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  their	  war	  plans,	  which	  includes	  avoiding	  escalation	  as	  a	  central	  objective.	  	  But	  in	  some	  theaters,	  planners	  would	  have	  difficulty	  articulating	  how	  specific	  operations	  have	  been	  tailored	  so	  as	  not	  to	  pressure	  adversaries	  to	  escalate.	  	  U.S.	  leaders	  may	  have	  identified	  escalation	  prevention	  as	  a	  key	  goal,	  but	  that	  objective	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  guiding	  actual	  war	  planning	  to	  anything	  near	  the	  degree	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  objective	  would	  seem	  to	  merit.	  	  The	  problem	  in	  controlling	  military	  operations	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  insubordination	  or	  incompetence.	  	  The	  real	  problem	  is	  fundamental:	  modern	  military	  operations	  are	  so	  complex	  that	  they	  defy	  fine-­‐grained	  control.	  	  Moreover,	  leaders	  justly	  feel	  it	  is	  inappropriate	  and	  impractical	  to	  pour	  over	  the	  tactical	  details	  of	  war	  plans	  and	  second-­‐guess	  their	  battlefield	  commanders.	  	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  trying	  to	  “win	  the	  conventional	  fight,”	  a	  division	  of	  labor	  that	  leaves	  strategy	  to	  the	  leadership,	  and	  operational	  details	  to	  battlefield	  commanders,	  is	  sound.	  	  If,	  however,	  a	  critical	  goal	  of	  military	  operations	  is	  to	  achieve	  desired	  military	  objectives	  while	  potentially	  exercising	  restraint	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  escalation	  avoidance,	  then	  the	  impediments	  to	  carefully	  controlled	  conventional	  operations	  could	  also	  undermine	  those	  efforts	  to	  prevent	  escalation.	  	  In	  sum,	  the	  nuclear	  escalatory	  dangers	  raised	  by	  conventional	  war	  are	  far	  greater	  than	  is	  commonly	  recognized.	  	  At	  a	  fundamental	  level,	  weak	  states	  face	  powerful	  incentives	  to	  escalate	  against	  strong	  states.	  	  Several	  factors	  stemming	  from	  the	  nature	  of	  modern	  warfare	  exacerbate	  this	  danger.	  	  Strong	  states	  with	  sophisticated	  militaries	  like	  the	  United	  States	  will	  inevitably	  target	  weaker	  states’	  command	  and	  control	  systems	  and	  strategic	  assets	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  a	  conventional	  conflict.	  	  This	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compounds	  the	  weaker	  regime’s	  fear	  of	  not	  surviving	  the	  conflict,	  and	  thus	  makes	  nuclear	  escalation	  as	  a	  means	  of	  forestalling	  defeat	  more	  likely.	  	  Moreover,	  efforts	  by	  stronger	  states	  to	  restrain	  such	  attacks	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  controlling	  adversary	  escalation	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  frustrated	  by	  the	  inherent	  difficulty	  of	  calibrating	  military	  operations	  in	  wartime.	  	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  military	  and	  political	  leaders	  appear	  either	  unaware	  of	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  problem	  or	  ill	  equipped	  to	  address	  it	  within	  the	  normal	  chains	  of	  command.	  	  The	  efforts	  these	  leaders	  might	  try	  to	  institute	  to	  avoid	  provoking	  nuclear	  escalation	  are	  essentially	  incompatible	  with	  the	  modern	  approach	  to	  conventional	  operations	  adopted	  by	  the	  U.S.	  military,	  which	  is	  highly	  (if	  unintentionally)	  escalatory.	  	  If	  adversary	  escalation	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  baseline	  expectation	  in	  a	  war	  between	  powerful	  countries	  like	  the	  United	  States	  and	  weaker	  but	  nuclear-­‐armed	  adversaries,	  then	  U.S.	  war	  plans	  should	  be	  designed	  specifically	  to	  include	  ways	  to	  reduce	  these	  escalation	  risks	  and	  mitigate	  their	  consequences.	  	  The	  means	  of	  doing	  so	  are	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section.	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III.	  	  Mitigating	  Escalation	  Risks	  	  The	  following	  section	  explores	  options	  for	  mitigating	  adversary	  escalation	  risks.	  	  After	  discussing	  several	  important	  caveats,	  we	  examine	  the	  need	  for:	  tradeoffs	  among	  desired	  end	  states,	  military	  effectiveness,	  and	  escalation	  avoidance;	  coherence	  between	  military	  operations	  and	  mission	  objectives	  in	  light	  of	  escalation	  dangers;	  communication	  strategies	  for	  adversaries,	  allies,	  and	  third	  parties;	  war	  plans	  that	  include	  explicit	  escalation	  avoidance	  strategies;	  realistic	  tabletop	  exercises;	  and	  military	  capabilities	  that	  can	  best	  mitigate	  the	  consequences	  of	  escalation	  if	  prevention	  fails.	  	  
A.	  	  Caveats	  These	  ideas	  below	  should	  be	  considered	  in	  light	  of	  three	  caveats.	  	  First,	  the	  recommendations	  in	  this	  report	  should	  not	  be	  applied	  uniformly	  across	  theaters.	  	  The	  likelihood	  of	  adversary	  escalation	  –	  and	  the	  triggers	  of	  escalation	  –	  will	  vary	  across	  scenarios.9	  	  Furthermore,	  various	  U.S.	  regional	  commands	  have	  already	  integrated	  aspects	  of	  these	  approaches	  for	  escalation	  avoidance	  into	  their	  war	  plans	  and	  operational	  concepts;	  indeed,	  some	  of	  these	  approaches	  were	  drawn	  from	  our	  discussions	  with	  those	  planners.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  recommendations	  should	  be	  used	  as	  a	  conceptual	  jumping	  off	  point	  for	  combatant	  commands	  and	  Defense	  Department	  leaders	  to	  identify	  the	  escalation	  risks	  in	  a	  given	  theater,	  to	  assess	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  For	  example,	  if	  war	  erupts	  on	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula,	  the	  North	  Korean	  government	  may	  quickly	  realize	  that	  its	  regime	  survival	  is	  at	  stake.	  	  The	  war	  could	  result	  in	  the	  conquest	  of	  North	  Korea	  and	  unification	  of	  the	  Peninsula	  under	  South	  Korean	  control.	  	  Even	  a	  more	  limited	  defeat	  could	  trigger	  a	  coup	  in	  Pyongyang.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  CFC	  military	  actions	  might	  trigger	  North	  Korean	  wartime	  escalation:	  for	  example,	  Coalition	  operations	  that	  weaken	  the	  regime’s	  hold	  on	  power	  from	  domestic	  opponents	  (e.g.,	  attacks	  that	  degrade	  DPRK	  internal	  security	  forces,	  or	  national	  command	  and	  control),	  or	  operations	  that	  indicate	  that	  the	  Coalition’s	  war	  aims	  include	  conquest	  of	  the	  Peninsula.	  	  By	  contrast,	  a	  war	  in	  maritime	  East	  Asia	  would	  not	  pose	  analogous	  threats	  to	  China.	  	  The	  primary	  escalation	  risks	  in	  that	  scenario	  might	  arise	  from	  operations	  that	  enhance	  the	  regime’s	  vulnerability	  to	  domestic	  threats.	  	  In	  both	  cases,	  there	  is	  significant	  danger	  of	  escalation,	  though	  the	  danger	  appears	  higher	  in	  the	  Korea	  case,	  and	  the	  specific	  escalation	  triggers	  would	  be	  different	  across	  the	  two	  scenarios.	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adequacy	  of	  specific	  OPLANS/CONPLANS	  in	  terms	  of	  escalation	  avoidance,	  and	  to	  modify	  those	  plans	  as	  needed.	  	  	  Second,	  this	  report	  is	  unclassified,	  which	  entails	  both	  disadvantages	  and	  advantages.	  	  The	  disadvantage	  is	  that	  this	  document	  cannot	  delve	  into	  the	  details	  of	  specific	  war	  plans,	  or	  the	  intelligence	  about	  specific	  adversary	  leaders.	  	  Fortunately,	  the	  core	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  adversary	  escalation	  is	  not	  one	  that	  lies	  in	  the	  classified	  details	  of	  a	  given	  war	  plan.	  	  Rather,	  the	  root	  of	  the	  problem	  lies	  in	  the	  broad	  strategic	  relationship	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  key	  adversaries:	  the	  United	  States	  military	  expects	  to	  prevail	  in	  conventional	  wars	  against	  most	  adversaries,	  and	  thus	  those	  adversaries	  must	  find	  a	  way	  to	  stalemate	  the	  U.S.	  military.	  	  Grasping	  the	  core	  of	  the	  problem	  does	  not	  require	  access	  to	  classified	  material.	  	  Furthermore,	  unclassified	  discussion	  of	  this	  problem	  facilitates	  wider	  discussion	  and	  debate	  within	  the	  U.S.	  military,	  civilian	  leadership,	  and	  analytical	  community,	  as	  well	  as	  with	  the	  broader	  public	  and	  foreign	  partners.	  	  	  The	  third	  caveat	  is	  the	  most	  important.	  	  The	  approaches	  we	  recommend	  to	  mitigate	  escalation	  risks	  do	  not	  solve	  the	  problem.	  	  The	  dilemma	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  partners	  face	  stems	  from	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  warfare.	  	  At	  its	  core,	  the	  purpose	  of	  military	  operations	  is	  to	  dominate	  the	  enemy	  –	  in	  order	  to	  impose	  one’s	  political	  preferences	  on	  it.	  	  Seeking	  to	  dominate	  an	  adversary	  while	  simultaneously	  convincing	  it	  to	  keep	  holstered	  the	  very	  weapons	  that	  might	  preserve	  its	  safety	  is	  an	  inherently	  contradictory	  task.	  	  Yet	  that	  is	  the	  task	  that	  the	  United	  States	  currently	  asks	  of	  its	  armed	  forces.	  	  Although	  the	  proposals	  described	  below	  do	  not	  resolve	  this	  inherent	  tension,	  they	  have	  two	  primary	  goals:	  	  First,	  to	  help	  U.S.	  regional	  commands	  identify	  adversaries’	  likely	  escalatory	  triggers,	  and	  consider	  alternative	  concepts	  for	  achieving	  desired	  end	  states	  that	  simultaneously	  minimize	  escalation	  risks.	  	  Second,	  to	  enhance	  transparency	  about	  the	  inherent	  tradeoffs	  embedded	  in	  U.S.	  war	  plans	  with	  respect	  to	  (a)	  military	  effectiveness	  and	  (b)	  escalation	  avoidance.	  	  Transparency	  is	  essential	  to	  ensure	  that	  those	  tradeoffs	  align	  with	  the	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judgments	  and	  priorities	  of	  the	  senior	  leadership	  within	  the	  combatant	  command,	  of	  the	  Defense	  Department	  leadership,	  and	  of	  the	  national	  command	  authority.	  	  
B.	  	  Reducing	  Risks	  and	  Mitigating	  Consequences	  The	  following	  approaches	  are	  intended	  to	  reduce	  escalation	  risks	  during	  conventional	  wars,	  and	  mitigate	  the	  consequences	  if	  it	  occurs.	  	  They	  seek	  to	  modify	  aspects	  of	  U.S.	  war	  planning,	  broaden	  the	  pool	  of	  U.S.	  officials	  with	  deep	  understanding	  of	  these	  issues,	  strengthen	  alliance	  cohesion,	  and	  enhance	  the	  capabilities	  that	  would	  reduce	  the	  consequences	  of	  escalation	  if	  escalation	  occurred	  –	  and	  thereby	  help	  deter	  adversaries	  from	  escalating	  in	  the	  first	  place.10	  	  	  	  
1.	  	  Provide	  Leaders	  with	  Range	  of	  Potential	  End	  States	  The	  end	  states	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  mission	  objectives	  –	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  coalition	  partners	  seek	  in	  a	  military	  campaign	  may	  be	  a	  crucial	  factor	  in	  driving	  adversary	  escalation	  decisions.	  	  In	  many	  cases,	  achieving	  ambitious	  objectives	  would	  give	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  partners	  greater	  geopolitical	  benefits	  than	  achieving	  lesser	  goals.11	  	  But	  when	  fighting	  a	  nuclear-­‐armed	  enemy,	  seeking	  ambitious	  end	  states	  entails	  great	  risk:	  it	  imposes	  greater	  costs	  on	  adversary	  leadership,	  thereby	  increasing	  their	  incentives	  to	  escalate	  to	  create	  stalemate.	  	  The	  alternative	  of	  seeking	  more	  limited	  aims,	  however,	  may	  also	  be	  fraught.	  	  Doing	  so	  may	  reduce	  adversary	  incentives	  to	  escalate	  (because	  their	  regime	  can	  survive	  the	  war	  without	  taking	  that	  risky	  step),	  but	  it	  may	  be	  deeply	  objectionable	  to	  U.S.	  leaders,	  U.S.	  partners,	  and	  their	  populations.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  North	  Korea	  begins	  a	  second	  war	  on	  the	  Peninsula	  –	  causing	  substantial	  destruction	  and	  death	  in	  Seoul	  –	  it	  may	  be	  nearly	  impossible	  to	  adopt	  war	  aims	  short	  of	  eliminating	  the	  DPRK	  regime.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  For	  simplicity,	  in	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  report	  we	  use	  the	  term	  “U.S.	  war	  plans”	  to	  refer	  to	  U.S.	  and	  coalition	  OPLANS	  and	  CONPLANS.	  	  We	  also	  often	  refer	  to	  “U.S.	  decisions”	  and	  “U.S.	  operations,”	  even	  though	  in	  most	  theaters	  critical	  wartime	  decisions	  will	  be	  made	  in	  a	  coalition	  context.	  	  Coalition	  forces	  would	  conduct	  many	  conventional	  operations.	  11	  Although	  in	  many	  cases	  achieving	  ambitious	  end	  states	  is	  preferable	  to	  achieving	  modest	  ones	  that	  is	  not	  always	  the	  case.	  	  For	  example,	  conquering	  an	  enemy	  (rather	  than	  inflicting	  a	  limited	  defeat	  upon	  him)	  may	  burden	  the	  United	  States	  with	  a	  costly	  occupation	  mission.	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  During	  any	  conventional	  war	  against	  a	  nuclear-­‐armed	  enemy,	  balancing	  these	  two	  key	  goals	  –	  achieving	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  for	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  partners	  while	  managing	  the	  risks	  of	  adversary	  escalation	  –	  would	  be	  a	  strategic	  and	  political	  matter	  of	  the	  highest	  importance.	  	  Finding	  the	  right	  balance	  might	  be	  especially	  challenging	  if	  the	  views	  of	  U.S.	  and	  allied	  leaders	  differ.	  	  Unfortunately,	  the	  end	  state	  /	  escalation	  tradeoffs	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  completely	  or	  even	  adequately	  resolved	  during	  peacetime.	  	  Senior	  U.S.	  political	  leaders	  cannot	  consider	  in	  depth	  the	  thorny	  tradeoffs	  and	  dangers	  in	  every	  potential	  military	  contingency	  that	  the	  United	  States	  faces.	  	  Moreover,	  adversary	  actions	  leading	  up	  to	  and	  during	  a	  conflict	  might	  change	  U.S.	  leaders’	  preferences	  significantly.	  	  Using	  the	  example	  from	  above,	  if	  North	  Korea	  launched	  devastating	  and	  indiscriminate	  attacks	  on	  Seoul	  during	  the	  opening	  phases	  of	  a	  conflict,	  U.S.	  and	  South	  Korean	  leaders	  might	  accept	  higher	  escalation	  risks	  to	  destroy	  the	  Pyongyang	  regime	  than	  they	  might	  have	  anticipated	  before	  the	  conflict.	  	  Or	  U.S.	  leaders	  could	  change	  their	  preference	  about	  desired	  end	  states	  after	  they	  are	  briefed	  about	  evolving	  capabilities	  to	  find	  and	  destroy	  adversary	  nuclear	  weapons.	  	  Or	  decisions	  reached	  in	  peacetime	  about	  balancing	  desired	  end	  states	  with	  escalation	  risks	  may	  call	  for	  actions	  that	  leaders	  find	  unacceptable	  in	  wartime.	  	  Relatedly,	  intra-­‐alliance	  compromises	  reached	  before	  a	  conflict	  might	  crumble	  in	  the	  heat	  of	  war.	  	  What	  this	  means	  is	  that	  war	  plans	  must	  be	  formulated	  such	  that	  senior	  political	  leaders	  always	  have	  some	  flexibility	  to	  make	  tradeoffs	  between	  various	  end	  states	  and	  the	  associated	  risks	  of	  escalation.	  	  There	  are	  at	  least	  two	  potential	  approaches	  for	  giving	  leaders	  options	  to	  decide	  on	  the	  appropriate	  end	  states	  /	  escalation	  risk	  tradeoff.	  	  One	  approach	  is	  for	  combatant	  commands	  to	  create	  families	  of	  plans	  for	  a	  given	  theater	  –	  all	  with	  a	  common	  foundation	  but	  each	  reflecting	  a	  different	  end	  state.	  	  A	  simpler	  approach	  is	  to	  create	  a	  single	  plan	  with	  a	  defined	  end	  state,	  but	  one	  that	  incorporates	  a	  set	  of	  “off-­‐ramps”	  that	  would	  allow	  political	  leaders	  to	  halt	  operations	  once	  less	  ambitious	  end	  states	  are	  achieved.	  	  The	  latter	  approach	  might	  place	  less	  of	  a	  burden	  on	  combatant	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command	  planners,	  which	  is	  an	  important	  benefit.	  	  However,	  for	  reasons	  described	  below,	  the	  “off-­‐ramps”	  option	  raises	  other	  serious	  challenges	  for	  escalation	  control.	  	  
2.	  	  Ensure	  Coherence	  Between	  Operations	  and	  Objectives	  Facing	  a	  nuclear-­‐armed	  adversary	  in	  a	  war,	  U.S.	  leaders	  and	  their	  coalition	  partners	  may	  reasonably	  choose	  to	  pursue	  limited	  objectives,	  very	  ambitious	  ones,	  or	  something	  in	  between.	  	  Whichever	  objectives	  they	  select,	  however,	  it	  is	  essential	  that	  there	  be	  strategic	  coherence	  between	  the	  conventional	  operations	  and	  the	  overarching	  strategy	  for	  avoiding	  escalation.	  	  In	  most	  cases,	  war	  plans	  that	  seek	  very	  ambitious	  end	  states	  (including	  but	  not	  restricted	  to	  adversary	  regime	  change)	  should	  include	  intense	  efforts	  to	  destroy	  enemy	  nuclear	  weapons	  capabilities	  from	  the	  outset.	  	  But	  plans	  designed	  to	  deter	  adversary	  escalation	  by	  limiting	  U.S.	  objectives	  should	  avoid	  attacking	  the	  adversary’s	  deterrent	  forces.	  	  The	  merits	  of	  limited	  or	  essentially	  unlimited	  objectives,	  and	  of	  restrained	  or	  ambitious	  operations,	  depend	  on	  the	  circumstances	  –	  but	  mismatching	  the	  two	  invites	  disastrous	  escalation.	  	  Circumstances	  may	  reasonably	  lead	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies	  to	  pursue	  maximalist	  objectives	  during	  a	  war	  against	  a	  nuclear-­‐armed	  adversary.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  an	  adversary	  has	  already	  conducted	  mass-­‐casualty	  conventional	  attacks	  against	  a	  U.S.	  ally	  or	  employed	  nuclear	  weapons,	  regime	  elimination	  may	  be	  viewed	  as	  the	  only	  acceptable	  outcome.	  	  Alternatively,	  if	  the	  adversary’s	  regime	  is	  so	  weak	  that	  even	  limited	  aims	  strategies	  would	  likely	  topple	  it,	  U.S.	  and	  allied	  leaders	  may	  decide	  that	  there	  is	  no	  meaningful	  limited-­‐aims	  option.	  	  Finally,	  if	  U.S.	  leaders	  believe	  they	  can	  completely	  neutralize	  adversary	  nuclear	  forces,	  they	  may	  prefer	  such	  an	  option	  to	  relying	  on	  the	  hope	  that	  intra-­‐war	  deterrence	  will	  hold	  (especially	  if	  the	  adversary	  has	  already	  threatened	  or	  employed	  nuclear	  weapons).	  	  If	  leaders	  select	  a	  maximalist	  end	  state	  against	  a	  nuclear-­‐armed	  adversary,	  they	  also	  need	  to	  plan	  to	  neutralize	  adversary	  nuclear	  forces	  –	  presumably	  by	  attacking	  weapons	  and	  delivery	  systems,	  impeding	  command	  and	  control,	  and	  striking	  leadership	  targets.	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  Conversely,	  if	  U.S.	  and	  allied	  leaders	  select	  a	  limited	  objectives	  operation,	  it	  is	  imperative	  that	  they	  avoid	  attacks	  on	  nuclear,	  leadership,	  and	  national-­‐level	  C4I	  targets.	  	  If	  adversary	  leaders	  are	  relying	  upon	  the	  threat	  of	  escalation	  to	  hold	  U.S.	  and	  coalition	  forces	  at	  bay	  –	  and	  permit	  their	  regime	  to	  survive	  the	  war	  –	  then	  attacks	  on	  their	  nuclear	  forces	  and	  leadership	  will	  logically	  be	  perceived	  as	  an	  effort	  to	  disarm	  and	  destroy	  their	  regime.	  	  To	  be	  clear,	  conducting	  conventional	  operations	  without	  attacking	  an	  enemy’s	  most	  lethal	  weapons	  systems	  seems	  to	  violate	  basic	  principles	  of	  warfare.	  	  Yet,	  such	  restraint	  is	  necessary	  if	  one	  seeks	  to	  avoid	  escalation	  by	  convincing	  the	  enemy	  that	  its	  regime	  will	  survive	  the	  conflict	  if	  it	  does	  not	  escalate.	  	  Although	  circumstances	  could	  require	  either	  a	  limited	  or	  a	  maximalist	  objective	  during	  a	  war	  against	  a	  nuclear-­‐armed	  adversary,	  a	  mixed	  approach	  may	  be	  the	  worst	  option.	  	  Adopting	  an	  unlimited	  aims	  war	  plan	  while	  withholding	  attacks	  on	  adversary	  strategic	  forces,	  leadership,	  and	  C4I	  invites	  escalation.	  	  Selecting	  a	  limited	  aims	  strategy	  to	  prevent	  escalation	  while	  attacking	  adversary	  nuclear	  forces,	  leadership,	  and	  C4I,	  will	  also	  likely	  trigger	  escalation.	  	  To	  make	  matters	  worse,	  faced	  with	  a	  war	  against	  a	  nuclear-­‐armed	  adversary,	  U.S.	  political	  leaders	  may	  choose	  to	  authorize	  a	  limited	  military	  operation	  because	  they	  are	  confident	  that	  escalation	  risks	  are	  manageable	  –	  not	  realizing	  that	  these	  “limited	  war	  plans”	  involve	  large	  numbers	  of	  strikes	  on	  nuclear,	  leadership,	  and	  C4I	  targets,	  or	  not	  appreciating	  the	  escalatory	  consequences	  of	  these	  strikes.12	  	  The	  problem	  of	  incoherence	  between	  the	  nature	  of	  military	  operations	  and	  escalation	  avoidance	  strategies	  is	  not	  merely	  theoretical.	  	  As	  discussed	  above,	  official	  U.S.	  objectives	  in	  the	  1991	  Persian	  Gulf	  War	  were	  to	  liberate	  Kuwait	  while	  simultaneously	  deterring	  Iraq	  from	  employing	  chemical	  or	  biological	  weapons.	  	  In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  The	  danger	  is	  similar	  to	  circumstances	  that	  allegedly	  arose	  during	  the	  Cuban	  missile	  crisis.	  	  Senior	  U.S.	  political	  leaders	  claim	  not	  to	  have	  known	  that	  the	  naval	  quarantine	  they	  ordered	  included	  operations	  to	  harass	  submerged	  Soviet	  submarines,	  or	  that	  the	  nuclear	  alert	  measures	  they	  authorized	  included	  provocative	  strategic	  reconnaissance	  operations	  against	  Soviet	  nuclear	  targets.	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other	  words,	  the	  United	  States	  adopted	  a	  limited-­‐aims	  strategy.	  	  In	  a	  pre-­‐war	  meeting	  with	  Iraq’s	  foreign	  minister,	  U.S.	  Secretary	  of	  State	  James	  Baker	  explained	  the	  outlines	  of	  the	  U.S.	  limited	  approach:	  the	  United	  States	  would	  not	  seek	  regime	  change	  as	  long	  as	  Iraq	  did	  not	  use	  its	  unconventional	  weapons.	  	  However,	  although	  the	  U.S.	  ground	  campaign	  was	  indeed	  limited	  –	  freeing	  Kuwait	  and	  destroying	  Iraqi	  military	  units	  in	  the	  southernmost	  parts	  of	  Iraq	  –	  the	  air	  campaign	  was	  a	  no-­‐holds-­‐barred	  effort	  against	  Iraqi	  CBW,	  leadership,	  and	  C4I.	  	  For	  reasons	  that	  are	  still	  not	  fully	  clear,	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  chose	  not	  to	  escalate	  with	  unconventional	  weapons;	  thus,	  the	  United	  States	  did	  not	  march	  on	  Baghdad.	  	  But	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  Persian	  Gulf	  War	  showed	  a	  major	  contradiction	  between	  the	  air	  campaign	  and	  the	  strategy	  for	  avoiding	  escalation.	  	  Analogous	  tensions,	  we	  believe,	  exist	  in	  some	  contemporary	  U.S.	  war	  plans:	  where	  even	  limited	  aims	  objectives	  involve	  massive	  air	  and	  missile	  attacks	  on	  the	  most	  sensitive	  adversary	  strategic	  assets.	  	  The	  conflicting	  imperatives	  described	  in	  this	  section	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  need	  to	  rapidly	  destroy	  nuclear,	  leadership,	  and	  C4I	  targets	  in	  plans	  aimed	  at	  regime	  change,	  but	  spare	  those	  targets	  in	  limited	  aims	  operations	  –	  creates	  problems	  for	  the	  approach	  that	  seeks	  to	  create	  flexibility	  in	  war	  plans	  by	  using	  “off-­‐ramps.”	  	  The	  off-­‐ramp	  approach	  relies	  on	  a	  single	  plan	  that	  nominally	  describes	  military	  operations	  that	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  maximalist	  outcome	  if	  fully	  executed.	  	  The	  flexibility	  arises	  because	  there	  are	  identified	  off-­‐ramps	  in	  the	  plan	  where	  leaders	  can	  halt	  operations.	  	  The	  problem	  arises	  because	  the	  maximalist	  plan	  may	  require	  massive	  early	  strikes	  on	  nuclear,	  leadership,	  and	  C4I	  targets,	  since	  those	  would	  need	  to	  be	  neutralized	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible	  if	  the	  plan	  were	  to	  be	  fully	  executed.	  	  But	  those	  targets	  are	  precisely	  the	  ones	  that	  should	  not	  be	  struck	  if	  leaders	  want	  to	  preserve	  the	  option	  of	  taking	  an	  off-­‐ramp.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  off-­‐ramp	  approach	  to	  war	  planning,	  with	  early	  pre-­‐planned	  attacks	  on	  strategic	  targets,	  may	  inadvertently	  push	  adversaries	  toward	  escalation	  and	  foreclose	  the	  possibilities	  of	  keeping	  war	  limited.	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3.	  	  Prepare	  Communications	  Strategies	  toward	  Adversaries,	  Allies,	  and	  Key	  Neutrals	  In	  the	  21st	  century,	  any	  conventional	  war	  plan	  requires	  a	  communication	  strategy	  –	  to	  convey	  to	  enemies,	  allies,	  the	  American	  people,	  and	  the	  global	  community	  the	  goals,	  limits,	  and	  justification	  for	  the	  war.	  	  When	  waging	  war	  against	  a	  nuclear-­‐armed	  adversary,	  however,	  the	  communication	  strategy	  takes	  on	  much	  higher	  importance:	  it	  may	  be	  the	  difference	  between	  success	  and	  catastrophic	  escalation.	  	  Effective	  communications	  with	  the	  enemy	  are	  essential	  during	  a	  war	  against	  a	  nuclear-­‐armed	  state.	  	  If	  the	  United	  States	  has	  chosen	  more	  limited	  objectives	  as	  a	  means	  to	  prevent	  escalation,	  the	  decision	  to	  restrain	  military	  operations	  accordingly	  must	  be	  conveyed	  to	  the	  enemy.	  	  In	  the	  fog	  of	  war,	  even	  a	  highly	  restrained	  operation	  will	  inevitably	  create	  incidents	  that	  could	  be	  mistakenly	  interpreted	  by	  enemies	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  expansive	  goals.	  	  Equally	  important,	  U.S.	  leaders	  must	  convey	  that	  U.S.	  restraint	  is	  conditional	  –	  and	  that	  adversary	  nuclear	  escalation	  would	  lead	  the	  United	  States	  to	  change	  course	  and	  seek	  regime	  elimination.	  	  The	  best	  means	  of	  transmitting	  those	  crucial	  messages	  –	  for	  example,	  directly	  by	  government-­‐to-­‐government	  contacts,	  through	  neutral	  countries,	  or	  via	  written	  or	  verbal	  statements	  –	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  adversary.	  	  	  	  Even	  in	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  partners	  pursue	  unlimited	  objectives	  –	  and	  are	  thus	  targeting	  adversary	  nuclear	  forces,	  leadership,	  and	  C4I	  –	  there	  is	  still	  a	  key	  role	  for	  communicating	  with	  the	  enemy.	  	  Efforts	  to	  directly	  communicate	  with	  military	  offers	  in	  the	  nuclear	  chain-­‐of-­‐command	  may	  be	  critical:	  to	  convince	  them	  that	  though	  their	  regime	  is	  doomed	  they	  will	  receive	  more	  benign	  treatment	  if	  they	  refuse	  escalation	  launch	  orders,	  and	  to	  threaten	  them	  with	  personal	  accountability	  if	  they	  execute	  a	  nuclear	  attack.	  	  Equally	  important,	  a	  conventional	  war	  plan	  against	  a	  nuclear-­‐armed	  state	  will	  require	  a	  well-­‐prepared	  communication	  strategy	  toward	  allies	  and	  partners.	  	  Outside	  of	  NATO,	  the	  United	  States	  does	  not	  share	  details	  about	  its	  nuclear	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capabilities	  and	  planning,	  even	  with	  close	  allies.	  	  (Even	  in	  the	  NATO	  context,	  there	  are	  limits	  to	  those	  shared	  details.)	  	  As	  a	  result,	  key	  U.S.	  allies	  –	  including	  those	  directly	  threatened	  by	  enemy	  nuclear	  attack	  –	  might	  over-­‐estimate	  or	  under-­‐estimate	  U.S.	  capabilities.	  	  Allies	  might	  support	  ambitious	  conventional	  military	  operations	  under	  the	  mistaken	  assumption	  that	  the	  United	  States	  can	  effectively	  protect	  them	  if	  the	  war	  escalates.	  	  Alternatively,	  allies	  may	  reflexively	  reject	  counter-­‐strike	  options	  –	  even	  after	  an	  adversary	  has	  escalated	  –	  because	  they	  do	  not	  appreciate	  the	  extent	  of	  U.S.	  offensive	  capabilities.	  	  U.S.	  national	  security	  policy	  
depends	  upon	  having	  strong	  allies	  in	  key	  regions,	  and	  a	  regional	  conventional	  war	  against	  a	  nuclear-­‐armed	  state	  will	  put	  those	  allies	  at	  grave	  risk.	  	  Therefore,	  U.S.	  leaders	  must	  build	  consensus	  with	  those	  allies	  during	  a	  conflict	  about	  appropriate	  end	  states,	  military	  options,	  and	  how	  to	  manage	  the	  risk	  of	  escalation.	  	  Building	  that	  consensus	  and	  reducing	  the	  risk	  of	  fracturing	  alliances	  may	  require	  greater	  information	  sharing	  about	  strategic	  capabilities	  with	  close	  U.S.	  allies	  –	  certainly	  during	  war,	  and	  perhaps	  during	  peacetime.	  	  The	  third	  critical	  component	  of	  a	  U.S.	  communication	  strategy	  during	  a	  conventional	  war	  against	  a	  nuclear-­‐armed	  state	  is	  communicating	  with	  neutral	  or	  third	  party	  states.	  	  Part	  of	  that	  effort	  is	  simply	  the	  routine	  practice	  of	  rallying	  support	  in	  the	  international	  community	  for	  U.S.	  military	  operations.	  	  But	  another	  part	  of	  that	  effort	  is	  even	  more	  critical,	  and	  may	  be	  a	  key	  component	  of	  efforts	  to	  prevent	  escalation.	  	  Specifically,	  the	  United	  States	  should	  seek	  to	  encourage	  strong,	  independent	  third	  parties	  to	  prepare	  “golden	  parachute”	  options	  for	  adversary	  leaders.	  	  If	  a	  conventional	  war	  is	  proceeding	  in	  a	  direction	  that	  puts	  the	  adversary’s	  regime	  survival	  at	  grave	  risk,	  one	  option	  for	  the	  threatened	  leader	  is	  escalation	  to	  create	  stalemate	  and	  halt	  the	  war.	  	  If	  an	  adversary	  leader	  needs	  to	  be	  persuaded	  to	  reject	  that	  plan,	  he	  needs	  a	  better	  alternative	  –	  another	  “way	  out.”	  	  One	  model	  is	  to	  persuade	  a	  neutral	  country,	  or	  another	  country	  allied	  with	  the	  adversary,	  to	  offer	  refuge	  and	  amnesty	  to	  the	  leader,	  his	  family,	  and	  his	  close	  advisors.	  	  The	  state	  offering	  amnesty	  must	  be	  powerful	  and	  independent	  enough	  to	  be	  able	  to	  credibly	  promise	  to	  resist	  post-­‐war	  pressure	  to	  extradite	  the	  adversary	  leadership	  after	  the	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golden	  parachute	  is	  taken.	  	  But	  those	  plans	  will	  take	  preparation	  by	  the	  country	  providing	  the	  amnesty	  and	  possibly	  even	  coordination	  with	  the	  United	  States	  –	  to	  provide	  a	  window	  for	  adversary	  leaders	  to	  escape.	  	  Communication	  with	  countries	  who	  might	  offer	  a	  golden	  parachute	  is	  therefore	  a	  potentially	  important	  element	  of	  escalation	  prevention.	  	  
4.	  	  Require	  Explicit	  “Escalation	  Avoidance	  Strategy”	  as	  Element	  of	  War	  Plans	  Any	  U.S.	  war	  plan	  against	  a	  nuclear-­‐armed	  adversary	  should	  include	  a	  simple,	  explicit	  section	  that	  explains	  the	  plan’s	  strategy	  for	  preventing	  escalation.	  	  That	  section	  should	  describe	  (a)	  the	  underlying	  assumptions	  about	  likely	  triggers	  for	  adversary	  escalation;	  (b)	  the	  decision	  whether	  to	  strike	  (or	  not)	  various	  strategic	  targets	  (including	  nuclear,	  leadership,	  and	  C4I)	  in	  light	  of	  the	  plan’s	  desired	  end	  state;	  (c)	  the	  communication	  strategy,	  as	  it	  pertains	  to	  escalation	  avoidance;	  (d)	  an	  estimate	  of	  the	  likelihood	  of	  preventing	  escalation;	  and	  (e)	  key	  uncertainties	  in	  the	  escalation	  avoidance	  effort.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  this	  section	  of	  the	  war	  plan	  would	  describe	  in	  one	  place	  the	  various	  approaches	  identified	  in	  this	  report.	  	  A	  clear	  articulation	  of	  the	  escalation	  avoidance	  strategy	  would	  have	  many	  benefits.	  	  First,	  it	  would	  highlight	  the	  importance	  of	  escalation	  prevention	  to	  planners	  working	  on	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  war	  plan	  –	  including	  details	  of	  air,	  ground,	  and	  naval	  operations.	  	  Doing	  so	  will	  make	  those	  planners	  more	  likely	  to	  recognize	  when	  elements	  of	  the	  plan	  are	  in	  tension	  with	  escalation	  avoidance	  goals.	  	  Ideally	  they	  would	  raise	  those	  issues	  with	  senior	  planners	  (and,	  if	  necessary,	  the	  issues	  would	  be	  referred	  to	  senior	  military	  or	  political	  leaders).	  	  	  	  Second,	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  escalation	  avoidance	  strategy	  will	  make	  explicit	  the	  judgments,	  assumptions,	  and	  tradeoffs	  that	  necessarily	  underpin	  efforts	  to	  shape	  enemy	  escalation	  choices.	  	  Highlighting	  them	  will	  help	  senior	  leaders	  at	  the	  combatant	  command	  and	  the	  Pentagon	  scrutinize	  those	  assumptions	  and,	  if	  necessary,	  direct	  that	  the	  plan	  be	  modified.	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  Finally,	  highlighting	  the	  escalation	  assumptions	  and	  strategy	  underlying	  each	  plan	  will	  allow	  the	  National	  Command	  Authority	  to	  make	  better	  informed	  decisions	  –	  during	  a	  crisis	  or	  war	  –	  about	  alternative	  courses	  of	  action.	  	  If	  one	  course	  is	  predicated	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  adversary	  nuclear	  sites	  can	  be	  targeted	  without	  triggering	  escalation	  –	  and	  the	  NCA	  disagrees	  –	  leaders	  may	  reject	  that	  military	  option.	  	  Alternatively,	  if	  there	  is	  a	  plan	  for	  a	  highly	  restrained	  campaign,	  but	  the	  NCA	  judges	  that	  the	  adversary	  regime	  will	  rapidly	  collapse	  in	  any	  case,	  leaders	  may	  select	  a	  military	  course	  aimed	  at	  rapidly	  destroying	  the	  enemy’s	  nuclear	  forces	  and	  then	  pursuing	  less-­‐restrained	  objectives.	  	  	  	  Overall,	  the	  purpose	  of	  describing	  in	  a	  simple,	  explicit	  fashion	  the	  escalation	  avoidance	  strategy	  underlying	  a	  war	  plan	  is	  to	  maximize	  transparency	  for	  the	  planners,	  the	  commanders,	  and	  the	  NCA.	  	  Doing	  so	  will	  reduce	  the	  chances	  of	  strategic	  incoherence	  between	  operations	  and	  escalation	  avoidance	  goals,	  and	  will	  give	  senior	  political	  leaders	  a	  clearer	  view	  of	  the	  strengths,	  weaknesses,	  and	  uncertainties	  of	  alternative	  courses	  of	  action.	  	  
5.	  	  Conduct	  Tabletop	  Exercises	  to	  Refine	  Escalation	  Concepts	  and	  Enhance	  Alliance	  
Cohesion	  The	  United	  States	  could	  organize	  regular	  tabletop	  exercises	  based	  on	  plausible	  conflict	  scenarios	  against	  nuclear-­‐armed	  adversaries.	  	  Some	  exercises	  might	  be	  “U.S.	  only,”	  but	  the	  exercises	  could	  eventually	  include	  officials	  from	  key	  regional	  allies.	  	  Of	  critical	  importance,	  highly	  credible	  country	  experts	  –	  possibly	  from	  the	  U.S.	  intelligence	  community	  –	  should	  play	  the	  Red	  Team.	  	  The	  exercises	  should	  be	  designed	  to	  permit	  the	  Red	  Team	  to	  make	  whatever	  escalation	  choices	  they	  deem	  realistic	  –	  that	  is,	  to	  escalate	  or	  not	  depending	  on	  their	  team’s	  assessment	  of	  the	  situation.	  	  The	  exercise	  should	  not	  stop	  at	  the	  point	  of	  adversary	  escalation	  –	  if	  that	  occurs	  –	  but	  instead	  challenge	  the	  players	  on	  the	  U.S.	  and	  allied	  teams	  to	  play	  several	  post-­‐escalation	  moves.	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  Conducting	  regular	  escalation	  avoidance	  exercises	  would	  have	  many	  important	  benefits.	  	  First,	  it	  would	  provide	  a	  tool	  for	  regional	  combatant	  commands	  to	  evaluate	  their	  concepts	  for	  waging	  war	  in	  their	  own	  theaters	  without	  triggering	  escalation.	  	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  several	  exercises,	  the	  Blue	  Team	  could	  try	  a	  set	  of	  military	  concepts	  against	  different	  Red	  Teams	  to	  gauge	  the	  range	  of	  plausible	  adversary	  responses;	  Blue	  could	  also	  use	  the	  series	  of	  exercises	  to	  evaluate	  alternative	  military	  concepts	  for	  conducting	  effective	  operations	  without	  triggering	  adversary	  escalation.	  	  Second,	  it	  will	  help	  expand	  the	  pool	  of	  senior	  U.S.	  leaders	  who	  understand	  the	  challenges	  of	  escalation	  avoidance	  during	  war	  and	  appreciate	  the	  conundrums	  that	  adversary	  escalation	  poses	  for	  the	  United	  States.	  	  We	  interviewed	  many	  knowledgeable	  government	  officials	  who	  were	  skeptical	  that	  rational	  adversaries	  would	  find	  any	  benefit	  in	  escalating	  a	  conflict;	  in	  their	  view,	  nuclear	  escalation	  is	  unlikely	  unless	  adversary	  leaders	  are	  delusional	  or	  irrational,	  or	  if	  they	  lose	  control	  of	  their	  forces.	  	  If	  Red	  Teams	  find	  realistic	  ways	  to	  escalate	  in	  a	  way	  that	  creates	  major	  problems	  –	  and	  bad	  response	  options	  –	  for	  the	  United	  States	  and	  partners,	  the	  exercises	  may	  lead	  U.S.	  officials	  to	  update	  their	  views	  about	  the	  logic	  and	  likelihood	  of	  adversary	  escalation.	  	  If	  the	  Blue	  Teams	  are	  drawn	  from	  SES-­‐level	  officials	  at	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  and	  Department	  of	  State,	  congressional	  committee	  staffs,	  and	  other	  relevant	  agencies,	  the	  exercises	  could	  substantially	  improve	  the	  level	  of	  appreciation	  of	  the	  escalation	  problem.	  	  Third,	  the	  exercises	  can	  be	  used	  to	  expand	  the	  pool	  of	  officials	  from	  key	  allied	  governments	  who	  have	  a	  deep	  understanding	  of	  the	  wartime	  escalation	  problem.	  	  Over	  time,	  as	  different	  officials	  rotate	  through	  the	  exercises,	  appreciation	  for	  the	  escalation	  problem	  will	  spread.	  	  The	  exercises	  may	  draw	  together	  the	  views	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  allied	  governments	  about	  escalation	  issues,	  and	  it	  will	  very	  likely	  enhance	  mutual	  understanding	  of	  the	  basis	  of	  any	  remaining	  disagreements	  or	  differing	  viewpoints.	  	  It	  is	  far	  preferable	  to	  air	  and	  explore	  these	  differences	  after	  an	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exercise	  than	  after	  a	  war.	  	  Ultimately,	  the	  experience	  should	  help	  minimize	  disagreements	  and	  enhance	  alliance	  cohesion.	  	  Finally,	  tabletop	  exercises	  can	  assist	  leaders	  in	  identifying	  the	  capabilities	  that	  would	  not	  only	  help	  U.S.	  and	  coalition	  forces	  conduct	  conventional	  operations	  in	  a	  less-­‐escalatory	  manner,	  but	  also	  allow	  them	  to	  respond	  more	  effectively	  to	  escalation.	  	  The	  latter	  point	  is	  crucial:	  if	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies	  can	  respond	  effectively	  to	  an	  adversary’s	  escalation	  –	  that	  is,	  if	  they	  can	  vastly	  reduce	  the	  adversary’s	  ability	  to	  harm	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  partners	  –	  then	  adversaries	  will	  have	  less	  incentive	  to	  escalate.	  	  	  A	  major	  obstacle	  to	  creating	  tabletop	  exercises	  that	  include	  post-­‐escalation	  moves	  by	  Blue	  Team	  is	  that	  a	  meaningful	  discussion	  would	  seem	  to	  require	  that	  participants	  be	  given	  detailed	  information	  about	  highly	  classified	  U.S.	  strategic	  (nuclear	  and	  non-­‐nuclear)	  capabilities.	  	  If	  so,	  participants	  would	  require	  appropriate	  security	  clearances,	  which	  would	  undermine	  the	  goal	  of	  broadening	  the	  pool	  of	  officials	  with	  deep	  understanding	  of	  the	  challenge	  of	  preventing	  escalation.	  	  Allied	  officials	  would	  also	  be	  excluded.	  	  This	  hurdle	  can	  be	  overcome,	  however,	  by	  creating	  unclassified	  “notional	  response	  options”	  for	  participants	  to	  consider;	  options	  that	  
roughly	  characterize	  the	  plausible	  categories	  of	  U.S.	  response,	  without	  providing	  operational	  details.	  	  This	  would	  entail	  some	  costs	  in	  terms	  of	  analytical	  precision.	  	  But	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  analysts	  employed	  unclassified	  force-­‐exchange	  models	  to	  argue	  for	  and	  against	  development	  of	  various	  weapon	  systems	  without	  breaching	  classification	  rules.	  	  The	  same	  can	  be	  done	  today,	  and	  the	  benefits	  of	  broadening	  the	  discussion	  of	  nuclear	  escalation	  issues	  beyond	  a	  relatively	  small	  group	  of	  military	  officers	  and	  other	  government	  officials	  with	  sufficient	  clearances	  would	  greatly	  exceed	  the	  costs.	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6.	  Enhance	  Capabilities	  for	  Countering	  Enemy	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  deterring	  wartime	  escalation	  and	  mitigating	  the	  consequences	  if	  it	  occurs,	  the	  United	  States	  should	  continue	  to	  improve	  its	  capabilities	  for	  locating	  and	  disabling	  adversary	  nuclear	  weapons.	  	  These	  capabilities	  include	  sensing	  systems,	  to	  locate	  fixed	  and	  mobile	  targets;	  strike	  systems,	  including	  prompt	  conventional	  and	  nuclear	  weapons;	  capabilities	  for	  impeding	  adversary	  strategic	  C4I;	  and	  defenses.	  	  We	  are	  not	  advocating	  a	  departure	  from	  current	  plans	  and	  posture.	  	  In	  fact,	  throughout	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  period,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  steadily	  invested	  in	  capabilities	  for	  countering	  enemy	  nuclear	  forces.13	  	  What	  has	  changed	  is	  not	  the	  desire	  to	  neutralize	  enemy	  nuclear	  forces,	  but	  the	  capabilities	  to	  do	  so.	  	  In	  the	  past,	  finding	  strategic	  targets	  such	  as	  mobile	  missiles	  was	  inordinately	  difficult.	  	  Mobile	  targets	  are	  still	  difficult	  to	  find,	  but	  the	  barriers	  to	  successful	  offensive	  operations	  are	  dropping.	  	  The	  assumption	  that	  mobile	  targets	  will	  always	  be	  too	  hard	  to	  locate	  is	  based	  on	  a	  bygone	  technological	  era.	  	  The	  computer	  revolution	  spawned	  a	  revolution	  in	  remote	  sensing	  –	  making	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  earth	  and	  objects	  on	  it	  increasingly	  visible.	  	  Adversary	  mobile	  missile	  launchers	  used	  to	  spread	  out	  across	  vast	  expanses	  of	  road,	  occasionally	  ducking	  in	  and	  out	  of	  tree	  cover	  to	  avoid	  predictable	  U.S.	  satellite	  passes.	  	  Today,	  they	  furtively	  scoot	  from	  one	  shelter	  to	  another,	  knowing	  the	  potential	  of	  U.S.	  satellites,	  UAVs,	  autonomous	  ground	  sensors,	  and	  other	  platforms	  using	  a	  myriad	  of	  sensors	  to	  track	  them.14	  	  Hiding	  is	  not	  futile.	  	  But	  it	  is	  harder	  than	  it	  was	  in	  the	  past,	  and	  growing	  harder	  every	  day.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  For	  a	  compelling	  account	  of	  the	  intensive	  U.S.	  strategic	  intelligence	  efforts	  and	  breakthroughs	  during	  the	  late	  Cold	  War,	  see	  Austin	  Long	  and	  Brendan	  Rittenhouse	  Green,	  “Stalking	  the	  Secure	  Second	  Strike:	  Intelligence,	  Counterforce,	  and	  Nuclear	  Strategy,”	  Journal	  of	  Strategic	  Studies,	  Vol.	  38	  (Winter	  2015),	  pp.	  38-­‐73.	  14	  For	  a	  document	  that	  offers	  insight	  into	  how	  the	  United	  States	  might	  integrate	  drones,	  ground	  sensors,	  and	  standoff	  weapons	  to	  hunt	  mobile	  targets,	  see	  Alan	  J.	  Vick	  et	  al.,	  “Aerospace	  Operations	  Against	  Elusive	  Ground	  Targets,”	  RAND	  Corporation,	  MR-­‐1398-­‐AF,	  2001,	  especially	  Ch.	  4	  and	  appendixes	  A	  and	  B.	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In	  the	  past,	  preemptive	  plans	  for	  disarming	  strikes	  against	  an	  adversary’s	  nuclear	  weapons	  had	  to	  promise	  near	  perfect	  success	  to	  be	  even	  considered	  a	  plausible	  option.	  	  In	  today’s	  strategic	  context,	  if	  an	  adversary	  has	  already	  employed	  one	  or	  more	  nuclear	  weapons	  –	  for	  example,	  as	  an	  escalatory	  strategy	  to	  coerce	  an	  end	  to	  the	  conflict	  –	  then	  the	  threshold	  for	  a	  disarming	  strike	  will	  likely	  be	  lower	  than	  perfection.	  	  More	  importantly,	  building	  capabilities	  for	  neutralizing	  adversary	  nuclear	  forces	  may	  be	  the	  best	  strategy	  for	  deterring	  escalation	  during	  a	  war.	  	  After	  all,	  if	  one	  does	  not	  have	  effective	  capabilities	  for	  neutralizing	  enemy	  nuclear	  forces,	  then	  one	  can	  only	  respond	  to	  an	  enemy’s	  escalatory	  strategy	  by	  accepting	  stalemate	  (which	  most	  would	  consider	  a	  tremendous	  defeat)	  or	  exchanging	  punitive	  nuclear	  strikes	  (which	  all	  would	  agree	  would	  be	  an	  utter	  disaster).	  	  But	  effective	  offensive	  systems	  negate	  the	  logic	  of	  coercive	  escalation.	  	  If	  the	  United	  States	  can	  respond	  to	  an	  enemy’s	  use	  of	  one	  nuclear	  weapon	  by	  destroying	  its	  remaining	  arsenal,	  then	  the	  adversary	  should	  see	  little	  point	  in	  coercive	  escalation	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  As	  the	  United	  States	  considers	  likely	  enemy	  strategies	  for	  countering	  U.S.	  conventional	  military	  supremacy,	  coercive	  escalation	  is	  a	  risky	  but	  potentially	  high-­‐payoff	  approach.	  	  U.S.	  leaders	  would	  do	  well	  to	  develop	  capabilities	  that	  offset	  this	  enemy	  strategy,	  as	  U.S.	  and	  allied	  vulnerability	  to	  nuclear	  coercion	  invites	  it	  from	  determined	  and	  desperate	  enemies.	  
	  	  	  
